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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") appeals from
a final judgment of the Third District Court suspending Abraham Bates from the
practice of law in Utah for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Constitution
article VIII , section 4, which provides that, "the Supreme Court by rule shall govern
the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err in finding that Mr. Bates did not engage in
intentional misappropriation when he used client funds for his firm's payroll, and
therefore, err in imposing a suspension rather than disbarment?
This issue was preserved through closing argument and through the
Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the District Court. [R. 689)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
While this Court will ordinarily presume the district court's findings to be
correct, it "reserves the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ
from the inferences drawn by the lower tribunal." In re Jardine, 2012 UT 67 ,-r 26.
The standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in
attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court

-

.
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reaardina
the aoorooriate
level of discioline
..
:

if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of Appellant,
submitted herewith:
Rule 14-601

Definitions; Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Rule 14-602

Purpose and Nature of Sanctions

Rule 14-603

Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Rule 14-604

Factors to be Considered in Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Rule 14-605

Imposition of Sanctions

Rule 14-607

Aggravation and Mitigation

Rule 1.15

Rules of Professional Conduct (with comments)
STATEMENT OF THE.CASE

Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. The district court

suspended Mr. Bates for a period of five months for violating rules 1.4(a), 1.15(a),
and 1.15(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The OPC appeals the district
court's decision and urges the Court, pursuant to its inherent authority to govern the

The Course of Proceedings: The OPC filed a Complaint against Mr. Bates

pursuant to a directive of a screening panel of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics
2

and Discipline Committee. [R. 1] On May 6, 7 & 8, 2014, the district court presided
over an adjudication trial to determine whether Mr. Bates violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Rules"). [R. 830] On March 2, 2015, the court issues its
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding that Mr. Bates
violated rules 1.4(a), 1.15(a) and 1.15(d) of the Rules. (R. 830) Accordingly, a
sanctions hearing was held on April 15, 2015. [R. 1138]

On June 1, 2015, the

court entered its order suspending Mr. Bates for five months. [R. 1138] The OPC
filed its Notice of Appeal on June 8, 2015. [R. 1150] .
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Mr. Bates was admitted to practice law in Utah on October 20, 2009 and
started a private practice around December 1, 2009. [R. 831] On July 1, 2010,
Mr. Bates formed Wasatch Advocates, a firm which he solely owned and operated
at all times relevant to the Amended Complaint and until the firm's dissolution on
January 31, 2012. (R. 831)
Bangerter Matter

Grant Bangerter first retained Wasatch Advocates to represent Rimroc
Properties and Development, LLC ("Rimroc"), a real estate investment company
of which he was a member. (R. 832) Wasatch Advocates' engagement was to
attempt to set aside a default judgment taken against certain members of Rimroc
in a case pending in federal court (the "Rimroc Case"). (R. 832)
3

In the same timeframe, Mr. Bangerter separately retained Wasatch
Advocates to represent him in lawsuit against a lender, ING , related to real
property he owned. (R. 833) Mr. Bangerter hired Wasatch Advocates to forestall
ING's foreclosure sale, scheduled for March 17, 2011. (R. 833) An initial
complaint and motion for TRO were drafted and filed in Fourth District Court by
Wasatch Advocates. The Complaint in the Fourth District Case bears Mr. Bates'
name on the caption and attached his digital signature. (R. 833) The court
granted Mr. Bangerter's motion for TRO, thereby forestalling the foreclosure sale.
(R. 833) However, because Mr. Bangerter failed to post the required bond , the
preliminary injunction did not issue, leaving ING free to foreclose on the property.
(R. 834) ING subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. (R.
834)

On or about May 23, 2011, Wasatch Advocates attempted to contact Mr.
Bangerter by email regarding his failure to make required payments to the firm .

•

(R. 834) In a letter dated May 25, 2011 Wasatch Advocates attempted to
communicate with Mr. Bangerter regarding the status of the case and his failure
to make required payments to the firm. (R. 834) Mr. Bangerter did not respond to
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a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (R. 835) On or about
June 10, 2011, Wasatch Advocates filed a motion to withdraw from the case , but
4

ING objected to the withdrawal. On July 11 , 2011, the court denied Wasatch
Advocates' motion to withdraw based on the lack of any substantive basis and
potential prejudice to judicial process and ING. (R. 835) Oral argument on the
motion to dismiss was scheduled for July 29, 2011.
On July 21, 2011, Mr. Bates' paralegal sent him an email informing him
that the court had denied the motion to withdraw and that oral argument was
scheduled for July 29, 2011 on the motion to dismiss. (R. 835) On July 21, 2011,
Mr. Bates attempted to get a former associate from his firm to handle the
hearing, but the former associate was unwilling or unable to assist. (R. 835) On
July 28, 2011, the day before the hearing, Mr. Bates instructed his paralegal to
contact opposing counsel and make arrangements to dismiss Mr. Bangerter's
case. The timing and circumstances suggest that Mr. Bates did so because he
was either unable or unwilling to attend the hearing on July 29, 2011. (R. 835)
Mr. Bates' paralegal prepared an email to opposing counsel and appended
a ·stipulation and order for dismissal of the case without prejudice. Opposing
counsel made clear ING would not agree to a dismissal without prejudice and
revised the stipulation and order to reflect a dismissal with prejudice and returned
it to Mr. Bates' paralegal. (R. 836) Mr. Bates' paralegal filed with the court the
stipulation and proposed form of order dismissing the case with prejudice. Mr.
Bates electronically signed the stipulation. (R. 836) The July 29, 2011, hearing
5

did not go forward and, on August 15, 2011 , the court entered the stipulated
order dismissing with prejudice Mr. Bangerter's claims. (R. 836)
Mr. Bates did not communicate with Mr. Bangerter prior to stipulating to a
dismissal of his case. Mr. Bates acknowledges that the case should not have
been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, absent advance consultation with Mr.
Bangerter. (R. 836)
Trust Account Matters
Between approximately July 2010, and February 2012, Mr. Bates
maintained a firm operating account and a separate client trust account at Zions
Bank. (R. 842) All checks written from the client trust account bear the signature
of Mr. Bates. (R. 842) Mr. Bates was the only person authorized to withdraw
money from the client trust account. No one other than Mr. Bates made online
transfers into or out of the client trust account. (R. 842)
The majority of legal fees paid to Wasatch Advocates between July 2010,
and February 2012, were fixed/flat fees that Mr. Bates deemed to be earned
upon receipt. The majority of those fees were deposited directly into Mr. Bates'
operating account, rather than the client trust account. (R. 842) At times,
whe_ther by mistake or in accordance ·with .an evolving policy on vVhere fixed/flat
fees should be deposited, some earned fixed/flat fees were deposited into the
trust account. Mr. Bates was aware· that, at times, fixed/flat fee payments that he
6

deemed to be earned upon receipt had been deposited into his trust account. (R.
842)
Mr. Bates periodically would transfer funds from his trust account to his
operating account based on his estimation of work that had been performed. The
transfers made from the trust account to the operating account were typically not
associated with a specific client. In determining how much to transfer, Mr. Bates
would consult (a) QuickBooks "Payments Received" reports for the time period in
question , (b) QuickBooks "Deposit Detail" reports, which included reports by
clients, (c) weekly practice management spreadsheets, and (d) bank account
records for his operating account and trust account. (R. 842)

Silver Stream Enterprises' Transaction
Wasatch Advocates employed the services of a third party vendor called
Silver Stream Enterprises ("Silver Stream") to perform loan modification services
on behalf of some of its foreclosure defense clients. (R. 844) On June 28, 2011,
Wasatch Advocates issued a check from the trust account in the amount of
$3,000 payable to Silver Stream for loan modification services rendered on
behalf of ten separate Wasatch Advocates' clients. (R. 844) At th e time the
check was written , none of the ten clients on whose behalf the check was written
had money that was being held in the trust account. Each of the ten clients had
made small payments in the previous thirty days ranging between $250-$500
7

under fixed/flat fee agreements providing for loan modification services. The fees
were deposited into Wasatch Advocates' operating account instead of the trust
account. (R. 844) Mr. Bates admits that this check should not have been written
from the trust account and claims this was a mistake. (R. 844)
Pennington Transaction

On October 10, 2011, Wasatch Advocates issued a check in the amount of
$2,325 .90 from the trust account to "Client Pennington" for "refunded legal fees"
as indicated by the memo line on the check. (R. 845) None of the legal fees
paid to Wasatch Advocates by "Client Pennington" had been deposited into the
trust account. Therefore "Client Pennington" had no funds in the trust account at
the time the check was written. (R. 845) Mr. Bates does not dispute OPC's claim
that the Penningtons did not have any fees in the trust account on October 10,
2011, and that the refund check was mistakenly issued from the trust account
rather than the operating account. (R. 846)
F.A. Apartments Transaction

On December 10, 2010 Wasatch Advocates received a $28,000 check
from client F.A. Apartments. The $28,000 was deposited into the client trust
.... +
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used for certain expenses authorized by F.A. Apartments. No portion of the
$28,000 held in trust was intended to be used for Mr. Bates' legal fees. (R. 847)
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Between December 10, 2010, and September 25, 2011, F.A. Apartments
authorized various expenditures from the $28,000 in the trust account. It is
undisputed that F.A. Apartments only authorized these funds to be used for
designated purposes. (R. 847) The authorized expenditures are detailed on
Defendant's Trial Ex. 82, BATES 1401. (Included in Addendum) (R. 847)
On January 3, 2011, Mr. Bates transferred $15,000 from the client trust
account to his operating account. (Trial Ex. 130 BATES 0485) As a result, on
January 3, 2011, the balance in Mr. Bates' trust account was $22,792.36 (R. 848)
(Def. Trial Ex. #130, BATES 0485) As of that date, F.A. Apartments had
1

authorized the firm to pay $3,206.38 in F.A. Apartment expenses. (R. 848)
Deducting these expenses from the original $28,000 means there should have
been $24,793.62 in trust for F.A. Apartments. So on January 3, 2011, Mr. Bates
was out of trust with F.A. Apartments in the amount of $2,001.26. (R. 848).
On March 15, 2011, Mr. Bates transferred $10,000 from his client trust
account to his operating account. (Trial Ex. 130 BATES 0493) On March 17,
2011, the balance in Mr. Bates' trust account was $8,926.83. (R. 848) As of that

1

Although F.A. Apartments had authorized certain expenses totaling $3,206.38
between December 10, 2010 and January 3, 201 1, Mr. Bates did not actually
write a check from th e trust account on behalf of F.A. Apartments until January
31 , 2015.

9

date, F.A. Apartments had authorized the firm to pay $16,729 .19 in F.A .
Apartment expenses. (R. 848) Deducting these expenses from the original
$28,000 means there should have been $11,270.81 in trust for F.A. Apartments.
(R. 848) Mr. Bates was therefore out of trust with F.A. Apartments on March 17,
2011, in the amount of $2,343.98 . (R. 848)
On June 28, 2011, Mr. Bates transferred $18,000 from his client trust
account to his operating account. (Trial Ex. 130 BATES 0507) On June 30,
2011, the balance in Mr. Bates' trust account was $5,351 .10. (R. 848) As of that
date, F.A. Apartments had authorized the firm to pay $18,427.10 in F.A.
Apartment expenses. (R. 848) Deducting these expenses from the original
$28,000 means there should have been $9,572.90 in trust for F.A. Apartments.
(R. 848) Mr. Bates was therefore out of trust with F.A. Apartments on June 30,
2011, in the amount of $4,221.80. (R. 848).
Between July 29, 2011, and August 2, 2011, the principals of F.A.
Apartments paid Mr. Bates a $16,500 retainer that was to be used for his work on
the matter. (R. 849) $16,000 of $16,500 was mistakenly deposited into the
operating account rather than the trust account. The $16,000 represented
unearned fees at th e time it was deposited into the operating account. (R. 849)
On or about August 23, 20 11 , Mr. Bates learned the $16,000 had been
mistakenly deposited in the operating account rather than the trust account. (R.
10

849) On or about August 24, 2011 , Mr. Bates and F.A. Apartments agreed that
instead of using the $16 ,000 retainer for Mr. Bates' legal fees, that amount would
be applied toward certain expenses that had originally been debited against the
$28,000 in trust. However, the $16,000 was not transferred to the trust account at
that time and remained in the operating account. (R. 849) After this agreement
was made, Mr. Bates understood that the $16,000 being held in his operating
account was client property and not firm property. (R. 1454) On September 16,
2011, Mr. Bates transferred $20,000 from his operating account to his payroll
account, leaving the operating account with a negative balance of $454.94. (R.
850) At the time of the September 16 transfer, F.A. Apartments had $16,000 in
Mr. Bates operating account. (R. 850) As a result of the September 16 transfer,
all of F.A. Apartment's funds were transferred to Mr. Bates' payroll account and
appear to have been used for the firm's payroll. (R. 850)
As of September 16, 2011 , Mr. Bates should have been holding in the trust
account at least $20,000 belonging to F.A. Apartments, from the residue of the
$28,000 originally placed in the trust account in combination with the $16,000
retainer that was mistakenly deposited into the operating account.

(R. 850)

However, on September 16, 2011, Mr. Bates' operating account balance was in
the negative and his total tru st account balance was $3 ,335.73. (R. 850)

11

A settlement of the F.A. Apartments matter was reached, which required,
among other things, payment of $20,000 to F.A. Apartments' creditor. (R. 849)
On September 26, 2011, a series of deposits were made into Mr. Bates' trust
account representing payments from various clients. (R. 850) Also on September
26, 2011, Mr. Bates transferred $10,000, which he had drawn from a line of
credit, from the operating account to the trust account. (R. 850) On September
27, 2011, Mr. Bates wired $20,000 from the trust account for the F.A.
Apartments' settlement. (R. 850)

John Liti Transaction
In October 2010, John Liti hired Wasatch Advocates to represent him in a
bankruptcy matter. (R. 851) As part of the bankruptcy, Mr. Liti was required to
turn over at least a portion of his 2010 tax refund to the bankruptcy trustee. (R.
851) On March 12, 2011 Mr. Liti delivered to Wasatch Advocates a $2,980.80
check representing his tax refund. On March 23, 2011, the check was deposited
into Wasatch Advocates' trust account. (R. 852) On July 31, 2011, Jennifer
Smock, the attorney handling Mr. Liti's bankruptcy, left the firm (R. 851) but did
not advise Wasatch Advocates of the funds being held in trust for Mr. Liti. (R.
852) Ms. Smock took with her Mr. Liti's file and continued to represent him. (R..
852)

12

On September 27, 2011, Mr. Bates wired $20,000 from the client trust
account on behalf F.A. Apartments. (R. 852) After the wire transfer, the balance
in Mr. Bates' client trust account was $497.73. (R. 852) As of that date, Mr.
Bates should have been holding in the trust account the $2,980.80 deposited by
Mr. Liti. (R. 852)
On December 2, 2011, Ms. Smock wrote a letter to Wasatch Advocates
advising that the bankruptcy trustee in Mr. Liti's case sought the 2010 tax refund,
and directing that $1,589.19 be paid to the trustee. (R. 852) On December 9,
2011, Wasatch Advocates COO Blynn Simmons delivered to the trustee a check
drawn on the trust account in the requested amount of $1,589.19. (R. 852) In a
letter dated December 23, 2011, to Ms. Smock, Ms. Simmons offered to refund
the balance of Mr. Liti's tax refund and requested that Ms. Smock respond with a
written acknowledgement authorizing the firm to release the funds to Mr. Liti. (R.
852) Ms. Smock responded by letter dated December 27, 2011, advising
Wasatch Advocates to return to Mr. Liti the balance of his tax refund. (R. 853)
Mr. Liti's funds were not returned at that time. (R. 853) Mr. Bates was out of
town on vacation during the time these exchanges were taking place. When Mr.
Bates returned in early January 2012, Ms. Simmons had quit Wasatch
Advocates. (R. 853) Mr. Bates claims he was unaware of the communications

13

the firm's possession. (R. 853)
After he returned in early January 2012, Mr. Bates began the process of
winding down Wasatch Advocates. This wind down included closing his
operating and trust accounts. Mr. Bates dissolved the firm effective January 31,
2012. (R. 853) At the time he dissolved the firm, Mr. Bates was holding funds in
trust for a few clients. Prior to transferring funds from his Wasatch Advocates
accounts to his new accounts, Mr. Bates attempted to identify all of the funds he
was holding in trust and to whom those funds belonged. Mr. Bates did not identify
any funds being held in trust as belonging to Mr. Liti. (R. 853) As of the time Mr. •
Bates transferred the funds he was holding in trust from his old accounts to his
new accounts, the $1,391.61 belonging to Mr. Liti was gone. (R. 853)
Mr. Bates acknowledges that the $1,391.61 should have been in \/Vasatch
Advocates' trust account when the trust account was closed, but it was not. (R.
853)
Mr. Bates first became aware that Mr. Liti was claiming he was owed
money from Wasatch Advocates' trust account in approximately March 2012
when the OPC served Mr. Bates with a copy of Mr. Liti's january 1 t, 20i 2 Bar
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amount claimed in Mr. Liti's Bar complaint differs from the amount actually
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deposited in the trust account. (R. 853) Mr. Bates testified that it was not until Ms.
Smock and Mr. Liti testified at the screening panel hearing that he understood
the particulars of the amounts owing to Mr. Liti. Mr. Bates paid the amounts owed
to Mr. Liti after the screening panel hearing. (R. 854)
Based on the above facts found by the trial court, the court concluded that
Mr. Bates violated rule 1.4 in the Bangerter matter for failing to communicate with
his client prior to dismissing the case; rule 1.15(a) in the Silver Stream and
Pennington matters for failing to maintain adequate records; rule 1.15(a) in the F.A.
Apartments matter for failing to hold client funds separate from his own, failing to
adequately safeguard client funds, and failing to keep earned fees separate from
unearned fees; and rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(d) in the Liti matter for failing to
safeguard client property, failing to hold the funds in the trust account, using client
funds for some other purpose, and failing to promptly refund the client's money. (R.
854)
ADDENDUM
The following documents are attached as Addenda to this Brief:
•

Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Adjudication
Trial)

•

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions Phase.

•

Trial Exhibit Defense #82
15
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The facts establish that Mr. Bates knowingly transferred client funds out of
his trust account and used those funds for his firm's payroll. It was error for the trial
court to conclude Mr. Bates' did not intentionally misappropriate client funds simply
because the client was unaware, and therefore, not harmed by the misuse of the
funds.
Because the trial court erred in not finding that Mr. Bates misappropriated
client funds, it incorrectly imposed a five-month suspension, where disbarment is
the presumptive sanction for intentional misappropriation.
This Court should exercise its own independent judgment, find that Mr. Bates
engaged in intentional misappropriation, and disbar him from the practice of law.
ARGUMENT
i.

ivir. Bates intentionaiiy Misappropriated Ciient Funds. ·

Misappropriation is "any unauthorized use of client funds entrusted to him
[the attorney], including not only stealing but also unauthorized temporary use for
the lawyer's own purpose, whether or not he [the attorney] derives any personal
gain or benefit therefrom." In re Nicholas Addams. 579 A.2d 190, 195 (D.C. App.
1990); quoting from In re Harrison. 461 A.2d 1034, 1036 (D.C . 1983).
This Court has stated that:

16

. •

A lawyer's use of client funds is intentional whether the money
is spent on a new Harley, food for orphans, or the quills and ink
for his firm. In any case, the effect is the same - counsel has
knowingly stolen his client's funds with the intent to spend the
money in a manner chosen by him and not the client.
In the Matter of the Discipline of Corey, 2012 UT21,I27.
When an attorney withdraws funds from his trust account, knowing those
funds belong to a client, and knowing he is not using the funds on behalf of the
client, he is engaging in misappropriation. That is what Mr. Bates did with F.A.
Apartment's money.
A. The January, March and June F.A. Apartment Shortfalls.
Although the trial court found that Mr. Bates was out of trust with regard to
F.A. Apartment funds in January, March and June, 2011, the court concluded this
was not intentional misappropriation because Mr. Bates did not "knowingly or
intentionally" cause the shortfalls. The trial court reached its conclusion that Mr.
Bates was negligent because it erroneously connected the missing trust funds to
Mr. Bates' lack of knowledge regarding the location of the clients' $16,000 retainer
payment. The trial court concluded:
It is undisputed that the amount of $16,000 was mistakenly
deposited into Wasatch Advocates' operating account, and
should have been deposited into Wasatch Advocates' trust
account on behalf of F.A ..... The OPC has failed to carry its
burden of proving that Bates was aware of the incorrect deposit
prior to August 23, 2011. The undisputed evidence at trial
showed that Bates expressly instructed his staff to deposit the
17

funds into the trust account. Additionally, the OPC failed to
meets [sic] its burden of showing Bates knowingiy or
intentionally caused the apparent shortfalls in the approximate
amount of $2,000 in March or June of 2011 and therefore this
conduct also does not constitute intentional misappropriation.
The shortfalls in the trust account were based on Bates'
negligent mental state. It was not until August 23, 2011, when
Bates informed F.A. he was about to bill his time for the
previous six weeks against the $16,000 deposit that Bates
learned F.A. funds were not in trust.

(R. 1142 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions

Phase,

,r 4(d))

Mr. Bates caused the shortfalls in the F.A. Apartment trust funds in January,
March and June of 2011 when he knowingly made large transfers out of the trust
account to meet payroll. These transfers occurred months before the F.A. clients
ever paid the $16,000 retainer that was mistakenly placed in the operating account.
These transactions are not related in any way. The fact that he was unaware the
retainer was deposited into his operating account in August of 2011, has nothing to
do with Mr. Bates' use of F .A. Apartment trust funds in January, March and June.
Further evidence that would support a finding that Mr. Bates knowingly
transferred F.A. Apartment funds out of his trust account without the clients'
authorization in Januar;, March and June is Mr. Bates' own testimony at trial that
he frequently monitored his bank accounts and had numerous ways of tracking
funds associated with clients:
18

Q. So you could go into Quick Books and look at all the

transactions, payment or bills associated with a particular client,
correct?
A. Correct, and let me just make sure I'm clear here.
believe we've talked about this with F.A. Apartments, but you
certainly should have been able to go in, and this would be a
complete and accurate representation , you know, as of the day
that it's printed; and certainly if it's printed later in time like this
one, it should be complete and accurate.

(R.1355 line 13-21)
Q. So anytime you could go into Quick Books and look,
see what payments you received from clients during a particular
period of time. In this case, October 29 through November 12?
A. Correct, and this was one of the documents that I
previously testified that I would rely upon in making either
transcripts [sic] from trust or payroll transfers, payment received
and then deposit detail, so I knew whether it was trust or
operating.

(R. 1356 line 22 - 1357 line 5)
Q. Where again you could go in and look for a particular
time period what payments - - where they were deposited,
exactly which account, which clients they were associated with?
A. With the exception of where you see clearing.

Sometimes it's clear.
(R. 1357 line 11-15)
Q . So you could log on and see _
all the transfers
associated with the various accounts at Zion's Bank, correct?

A. Correct.

(R. 1358 line 12-14)
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Q. So ~y1ou cou!d !ook up a!! the transactions associated
with - - that had been recorded in Quick Books for a particular
account?

A. Uh-huh.

(R. 1360 line 4-7)

When asked about going online to see transactions associated with a
particular bank account, Mr. Bates testified that, "I acknowledge I did so frequently,
more freauentlv than. for examole. receivina a monthlv bank statement in the mail
'

.I

I

•

'

.._,

J

or through email." (R. 1356 line 15-17)
With regard to the large transfers from the trust account, three of which
resulted in the January, March and June use of F.A. Apartment funds, the evidence
led the trial court to find that:
Mr. Bates periodically would transfer funds from his trust
account to his operating account based on his estimation of
work that had been performed. The transfers made from the
trust account to the operating account were typically not
associated with a specific client. In determining how much to
transfer, Mr. Bates would consult (a) Quickbooks "Payments
Received" reports for the time period in question, (b)
Quickbooks "Deposit Detail" reports, which included reports by
client, (c) weekly practice management spreadsheets, and (d)
bank account records for his operating account and trust
account.
(R. 843, Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ,r 77)
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transfer, and the court's specific finding that he would consult bank records for both
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his operating and trust accounts before making any transfers, it was error for the
trial court to conclude that Mr. Bates did not knowingly cause the short falls in the
trust account when he transferred money out.

If the purpose of reviewing the

information was to determine how much money to transfer, as claimed by Mr.
Bates, and if the information revealed how much money had been deposited or
withdrawn in each account and which transactions were associated with which
clients, as claimed by Mr. Bates, then how could he not know he was using F.A.
Apartment funds when he made the large transfers that left a deficit in the client's
funds?

In short, if Mr. Bates actually reviewed all the documents he said he

reviewed then he knew he was dipping into F .A. Apartment funds with the January,
March and June transfers.
8. The September 16, 2011 Transfer to Payroll.

The $28,000 deposited into Mr. Bates' client trust account in December
2010, represented rents collected by his client, F.A. Apartments. The funds were to
be held in trust until a dispute with F.A. Apartments and a creditor were resolved.
Although the client authorized Mr. Bates to make certain payments out of the
account to keep the apartments functioning, (i.e. utility bills), it was understood that
none of those funds were to be used for Mr. Bates' attorneys fees or anything not
authorized by the client.

On or around August 1, 2011 , the principles of F.A.

Apartments gave a $16,500 retainer to Mr. Bates to be used for his legal fees.
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$16,000 of that amount was mistakenly placed in Mr. Bates' operating account,
rather than his client trust account. It was not until approximately August 23, 2011,
that Mr. Bates learned the unearned funds were in his operating account rather
than his trust account. However, the funds remained in the operating account and
were not transferred to the trust account.
As discussed above, and as shown on Trial Ex. #82, between December 10,
2010, and August 23, 2011, the amount that was to be held in trust had been
reduced from $28,000 to $7,321,41 for expenses authorized by F.A. Apartments. In
September 2011, F.A. Apartments reached a settlement with its creditor in which it
agreed, in part, to pay $20,000 from the funds being held in trust.

However,

because of the expenses that had been taken out of the account, there was far less
than the necessary $20,000 in the account. At that point, on or about August 24,
2011, Mr. Bates and his clients reached an agreement whereby the $16,000
retainer would be used to off-set the shortfall in the trust account, thereby allowing
F.A. Apartments to settle its case.

Mr. Bates acknowledges the funds then

changed from being an unearned retainer to the property of F.A. Apartments.
A .... I acknowledged that when I made that offer to them
to defer billing against it and they accepted, that that was not
firm property, and it was client [sic]."
Q. You weren't just assuming it was your money at that

point?
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A. That's right.
(R. 1454, line 6-11)
Despite his recognition the funds belonged to his clients, Mr. Bates left the
$16,000 in his operating account. Then, on September 16, 2011, when it was time
for his semi-monthly payroll, Mr. Bates knowingly transferred $20,000 from his
operating account to his payroll account. That reduced the balance in Mr. Bates'
operating account to negative $454.94. The $16,000 belonging to F.A. Apartments
was gone; it was used to pay Mr. Bates' employees. On that date, the date the trial
court found he was supposed to be holding $20,000 in trust for F.A. Apartments (R.
850), Mr. Bates' trust account balance was only $3,335.73 and his operating
account was in the negative.

F .A. Apartment funds were now in the payroll

account, where they were subsequently spent. That is intentional misappropriation.
Notwithstanding its finding that Mr. Bates' conduct with regard to F.A.
Apartment funds was, "done knowingly" after August 23, 2011, the trial court
concluded this conduct did not amount to misappropriation because:
The OPC has not met its burden of showing that Bates made
the transfer to payroll with the specific intent to use F.A. Funds
to benefit himself, another, or to harm F.A.. Moreover, F.A. was
not actually harmed in any way and. shortly after the transfer to
payroll all of F.A.'s funds were prop~rly .accounted for.
(R. 1142)
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It vvas error for the trial co_
urt to conclude rv'!r. Bates did not use F.,tJ.,.
Apartment funds to benefit himself where he used the funds to pay his employees.
But for his clients' funds, Mr. Bates would have been unable to satisfy his payroll
obligations from the money in his accounts.

The fact that Mr. Bates borrowed

money from his lines of credit a few days later to re-inflate the balance of his
operating account does not mean Mr. Bates did not benefit from his misuse of his
clients' money.
Furthermore, it was error for the trial court to rely on a lack of harm to the
client as justification for not finding misappropriation. This Court has made it clear
that, with regard to intentional misappropriation:
A lawyer's lack of motive to injure his client is irrelevant to the
intent inquiry.
. . . the intent inquiry focuses not on whether the attorney
intended to injure his ciient through his misconduct, but rather
whether he intended to benefit himself or another through it.
In re Corey, 2012 UT 21 if26, note 16.
The facts support a finding that Mr. Bates intended to benefit himself by
using his clients' funds for payroll.

If he didn't use F.A. Apartment funds, he

would have had to borrow the money because he did not have sufficient funds in
any of his accounts to meet his obligations. The fact that he did not intend to
injure his clients by using their money is irrelevant.
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II.

Disbarment Is
Misconduct.

The

Appropriate

Sanction

For

Mr.

Bates'

Pursuant to rule 14-605(a) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or
another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or
potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal
system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference
with a legal proceedings; or
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary
element of which includes intentional interference with the
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation,
fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft, or the sale,
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or
solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

Misappropriation can fall into any of these three broad categories. Even
without a criminal conviction for misappropriation under paragraph (a)(2), taking
client funds will still warrant disbarment under paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(3).
In the case of In re Johnson. 48 P.3d 881, 885 (2001 ), this Court found
that disbarment was appropriate under both paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3)
because misappropriation is conduct involving dishonesty that seriously reflects
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on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. This Court has been unequivocal in its
declarations that, "an intentional act of misappropriation of a client's funds is an
act that merits disbarment." In the Matter of the Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 217 (Utah
1997).
In the present case, however, relying on its incorrect view of intent, the trial
court erroneously concluded, "the presumptive sanction for [Mr. Bates'] conduct
is suspension under 14-605(b)(1 ), which involves knowing but unintentional
misconduct that caused potential harm."

(R. 1143, Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions Phase, ,-r 4)
It appears the trial court gave more weight to the clients' understanding of
what occurred than it did to Mr. Bates' actual conduct:
The court understands that imposition of a sanction, including
disbarment, does not necessarily turn on a client's satisfaction
or whether or not the client filed a bar complaint.
Nevertheless, the fact that the client testified it was completely
satisfied with the representation, that it found no reason to file
a complaint with the Bar, and that after all of the events came
to light it still maintains that the lawyer provided the services in
the manner requested, without any' harm to the client,
seriously undermines the OPC's contention that a sanction
amounting to professional death penalty is warranted.2

2

The disciplinary case against Mr. Bates was initiated based on the complaint
filed by Mr. Liti. During the course of its investigation into Mr. Bates' conduct as it
related to the funds being held in trust for Mr. Liti, the OPC discovered the
misuse of F.A . Apartment's trust funds.
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(R. 1139, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions
Phase, 1f 3)
However, the fact that a client is satisfied with the representation and
unaware of the attorney's misdeeds is not a defense to misappropriation. This
Court addressed the issue of a client's knowledge while upholding the sanction of
disbarment in In the Matter of the Discipline of Lundgren, 2015 UT 581f 23:
And Mr. Lundgren misses the ethical point entirely when he
attempts to minimize his misappropriation by asserting that it
is "philosophically debatable if the client does not know of the
removal of funds over which the client does not have control,
whether there is actual injury." It is not philosophically
debatable whether stealing money is okay so long as the
victim never finds out.
In Lundgren the attorney settled a worker's compensation case and
retained $2,500 of the client's share in order to pay her outstanding medical bills.
Rather than use the money to pay the medical bills, the attorney took the money
from the trust account for his personal and business use.

The client was

unaware her funds were being misused for several months and the attorney
eventually accounted for the funds by paying the medical bills. Nonetheless, this
Court found his conduct amounted to intentional misappropriation:
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•
Mr. Lundgren, ... knovvingly took funds that vvere not on!y
unearned, but would never be earned, and were in fact
earmarked for another purpose, namely, to pay [his client's]
medical bills.

!_g_. at ,r 21 .
Like the attorney in Lundgren, Mr. Bates knowingly took funds that would
never be earned, and were in fact earmarked to pay his clients' creditors, and
used them for his own purpose. The clients' lack of knowledge is not a factor in
making a determination as to misappropriation. To hold otherwise would simply
reward attorneys who are more steaithy than others in their misuse of client
property.
It was error for the trial court to conclude Mr. Bates did not engage in
intentional misappropriation and that disbarment was not the appropriate
sanction based on the clients' lack of knowledge that the funds had been taken;
and based on the clients' unwillingness to complain against the attorney.
iii.

There Are No Mitigating Factors That Justify A Departure From
The Presumptive Discipline.

In cases of intentional misappropriation, departure from the presumptive
sanction of disbarment, "is only appropriate in cases presenting truly compelling
mitigating circumstances." In the Matter of Grimes, 212 UT 87 ,r 21.
In the present case, Mr. Bates failed to establish that the mitigating
circumstances were "truly compelling." In fact, some of the factors found by the
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trial court are not mitigating at all.
A. Good Faith Effort to Rectify Consequences.

The trial court concluded that, "Bates made a good faith effort to rectify the
consequences of his conduct by making restitution to Liti." (R . 1144, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions Phase,

1f 7)

A conclusion that the restitution was made in "good faith" seems
inconsistent with the trial court's finding that, "Mr. Bates probably could have, and
probably should have, refunded the money more promptly than he did ... " lg. at 1f
4(c)) Although he claims to have been unclear about the exact amount owed to
his client, Mr. Bates made no effort to ascertain the correct amount and did not
refund Mr. Liti's money until the day of the Screening Panel hearing. As stated
by this Court, "the repaying of [the client's] money, though the right thing to do,
was not accomplished in a way that mitigates the misappropriation."
Matter of Ennegna, 2001 UT 111

In the

1f 13.

Even if an attorney repays money that was stolen: as was the case with
F.A. Apartment funds, it would seem a rare circumstance that restitution would
be a "truly compelling" mitigating factor sufficient to justify a departure from
disbarment.
B. Remorse.
The trial court found, "that Bates has expressed remorse for his actions."
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•
(R. 1144, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions
Phase, ,I 7)

However, the basis for this finding is unclear. Mr. Bates' testimony

at trial came nowhere near to expressing remorse for his misuse of F.A.
Apartment funds:
Q. All right, I want to finish up in mitigating factors with

remorse, No. 13. First of all, I think you've acknowledged but I
want to make clear on the record, you acknowledge you've
made mistakes, professional mistakes when you were at
Wasatch Advocates?
A. Yes, I've made a number of mistakes and had too
much confidence in my own abilities and have been humbled
through this process that leads me here today.
(R.1473, line 11-18)
Although Mr. Bates' testimony went on to describe how difficult it was to
manage his growing law firm, he at no time expressed remorse for using F.A .
Apartment funds to pay his employees.

In fact, Mr. Bates' refusal to even

acknowledge that it was wrong for him to use his clients' funds without their
authorization would seem to preclude a finding that remorse is a truly compelling
mitigating factor in this case.
C. Inexperience in the Practice of Law.
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Third, and most significantly, the court finds that the mitigating
factor which carries predominant weight is Bates' inexperience
in the practice of law. Bates bit off far more than he was able
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to chew in building such a large law firm less than two years
out of law school. The rule violations that occurred in the
latter half of 2011 occurred because Bates was in way over
his head in his efforts to expand his firm so quickly and on a
scale which a more experienced lawyer would have avoided.
(R. 1144, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions
Phase, ,I 7) Mr. Bates' inexperience may mitigate his failure to communicate in
the Bangerter matter, or explain his negligence in the Liti matter, but this Court
has made it clear that, "it does not take substantial experience in the practice of
law to know that misappropriation is improper," because, " ... the prohibition on
misappropriation of client funds is fundamental to the practice of law." In the
Matter of Grimes, 2012 UT 87,I 26.

In short, Mr. Bates did not use F.A.

Apartment funds for his payroll because he was inexperienced in the practice of
law. He used them because he needed them and the alternative was to incur
more debt.
D. Full Disclosure and Cooperative Attitude.
On this issue, the trial court stated , "the court finds, and the OPC does not
dispute, that Bates made full disclosure and was cooperative at all times during
these disciplinary proceedings." (R. 1144, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Pertaining to Sanctions Phase,

il 7)

While the OPC agreed that Mr. Bates was cooperative during the
disciplinary proceedings, there is no evidence, and the OPC never conceded,
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his use of client funds, Mr. Bates has maintained that he did nothing wrong in
using them. The basis for this statement by the trial court is unclear. Mr. Bates
did not disclose his misappropriation of client funds.
E. Modest Salary
The trial court stated, "Mr. Bates paid himself a modest salary and at the
end of the day ended up losing a substantial amount of money as a result of the
operation and winding down of Wasatch Advocates." (R. 1144, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Sanctions Phase,

il 7)

Whether Mr. Bates in fact only paid himself a modest salary during the
oeriod of time he ooerated his firm is irrelevant to the issue of misappropriation.

I

, -
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•

•

The reasoning of the trial court seems to be that Mr. Bates' decision to not take a
iot of money out of the firm to pay himself somehow mitigates his decision to use
client funds for payroll because it is evidence that Mr. Bates lacked a dishonest
or selfish motive. This is not a mitigating factor.
F. Good Reputation.
Although the trial court found that Mr. Bates had a good reputation, the
court did not view this as a significant mitigating factor;: given that Mr. Bates had
only been practicing for two years.
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Aggravating Factors
As an aggravating factor, the trial court only found multiple offenses.
In sum, the mitigating circumstances found by the trial court are not "truly
compelling" as required to justify a departure from the presumptive sanction of
disbarment for misappropriation.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Bates knew he deposited $28,000 into his client trust account.

Mr.

Bates knew the money belonged to F.A. Apartments. Mr. Bates knew he took
money out of the trust account in January, March and June for payroll. If Mr.
Bates reviewed the documents he claims to have reviewed. prior to the January,
March and June transfers, then he knew he did not have sufficient funds in the
trust account to cover the transfers without using funds belonging to F.A.
Apartments. Mr. Bates knew he received a $16,000. retainer from the F.A.
Apartments principles.

Mr. Bates knew he was holding the $16,000 in his

operating account. Mr. Bates knew the $16,000 was client property. Mr. Bates
knew he transferred the $16,000 to his payroll account. Mr. Bates knew he paid
his employees from the payroll account.
A consideration of everything Mr. Bates knew supports the conclusion that
he knowingly used F.A. Apartments funds to benefit himself and engaged in
intentional misappropriation.

33

T k - "-.,..;_1 - - •

,.,..,!.

I 11c; ll 101 l..,UUI l

- ..-..-- ...J
c:; 1 I c;u

;.....,
111

♦,_,J; __

i!.,,.,,-4, !\ A..111 IUll 18 ll lOL IVII.

_V"'\ ____ ;_

□-"--- ,J ; .,.J --.f.
;-i-~+i- -...-, !
UaLc;;:> UIU I IUL c:;11808C 111 11 llCI lll VI IO I

misappropriation and erred in imposing a five month suspension rather than
disbarment as a sanction for Mr. Bates' misconduct. This Court should reverse
the trial court and disbar Mr. Bates from the practice of law.

Dated: December/ I., 2015.
OFFICE OF P OFESSIONAL.,,,CONDUCT

De
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Article 6. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Rule 14-601. Definitions.
As used in this article:
(a) "complainant" means the person who files an informal complaint or the OPC when
the OPC determines to open an investigation based on information it has received;
(b) "formal complaint" means a complaint filed in the district court alleging misconduct
by a lawyer or seeking the transfer of a lawyer to disability status;
(c) "informal complaint" means any written, notarized allegation of misconduct by or
incapacity of a lawyer;
(d) "injury" means harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which
results from a lawyer's misconduct. The level of injury can range from "serious" injury to
"little or no" injury; a reference to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater than
"little or no" injury;
(e) "intent" means the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result;
(f) "knowledge" means the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result;
(g) "negligence" means the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation;
(h) "potential injury" means the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the
profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and
which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the
lawyer's misconduct;
(i) "respondent" means a lawyer subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court against whom an informal or formal complaint has been filed; and

U) "Rules of Professional Conduct" means the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
(including the accompanying comments) initially adopted by the Supreme Court in 1988,
as amended from time to time.

•
Rule 14-602. Purpose and nature of sanctions.

(a) Summary. This article is based on the Black Letter Rules contained in the Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions prepared by the American Bar Association's Center for
Professional Responsibility. They have been substantially revised by the Supreme
Court. Notably, ABA Standards 4 through 8 have been reduced into a single Rule 14605.
(b) Purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings. The purpose of imposing lawyer sanctions
is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those
who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, and to protect
the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by
their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to discharge properly their
professional responsibilities.
(c) Public nature of lawyer discipline proceedings. Ultimate disposition of lawyer
discipline shall be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand, and
nonpublic in cases of admonition.
(d) Purpose of these rules. These rules are designed for use in imposing a sanction or
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Descriptions in these rules of
substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended to create grounds for determining
culpability independent of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rules constitute a
system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning
sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote:
(d)(1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of sanction
in an individual case;
(d)(2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated goals
of lawyer discipline; and
(d)(3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar
offenses within and among jurisdictions.

Rule 14-603. Sanctions.

(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct.
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A lawyer who
has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525.
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a
specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be imposed for a
specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the
time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years.
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be reinstated as
set forth in Rule 14-524.
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may be reinstated
as set forth in Rule 14-525.
(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer
from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth in Rules 14518 and 14-519.
(e) Reprimand . Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer
improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of the
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.

(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under .
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in
conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or
reinstatement.
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a form of
public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of law while
either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the respondent. Resignation
with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in Rule 14-521.
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be imposed
include:

(i)(1) restitution;
· (i)(2) assessment of costs;
(i)(3) limitation upon practice;
(i)(4) appointment of a rece iver;
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or professional
responsibility examination; and

•
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses.
U) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary sanction
on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another jurisdiction, or a
regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction.

Rule 14-604. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions.

The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding of
lawyer misconduct:
·
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors .

Rule 14-605. Imposition of sanctions.

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out
in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate.
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or
another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes
intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation , fraud , extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt
or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law.
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a
party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential interference
with a·legal proceeding; or
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Rule 14605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law.
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or
the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a party,
the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes potential interference with a
legal proceeding ; or

•

(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this rule that
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

Rule 14-607. Aggravation and mitigation.

After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may
be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to impose.
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed .
Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a)(1) prior record of discipline;
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive;
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct;
(a)(4) multiple offenses;
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with
rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices
during the disciplinary process;
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to
the client or to the disciplinary authority;
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim;
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the
misconduct involved; and
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors
that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed . Mitigating
circumstances may include:
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems;
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the
misconduct involved;
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law;
(b)(7) good character or reputation;

•

(b)(8) physical disability;
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is
unlikely;
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did
not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the respondent has
demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay;
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or impairment;
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(b)(13) remorse; and
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses.
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered as
either aggravating or mitigating:
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution;
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain.

Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property.

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own
property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the
lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. The
account may only be maintained in a financial institution that agrees to report to the
Office of Professional Conduct in the event any instrument in properly payable form is
presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of
whether or not the instrument is honored. Other property shall be identified as such and
appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole
purpose of paying bank service charges on that account. but only in an amount
necessary for that purpose.
(c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have
been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or
expenses incurred.
·
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this
Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
(e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which
two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property
shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall
promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in
dispute.
Comment
[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional
fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form
of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property
of clients or third persons, including prospective cl ients, must be kept separate from the
lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts.
Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting
in similar fiduciary capacities. In addition to normal monthly maintenance fees on each
account, the lawyers can anticipate that financial institutions may charge additional fees
for reporting overdrafts in accordance with this Rule. A lawyer should maintain on a
current basis books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting
practice and comply with any recordkeeping rules established by law or court order.
See, e.g., ABA Model Financial Recordkeeping Rule.

[2] While normally it is impermissible to comm ingle the lawyer's own funds with client
funds, paragraph (b) provides that it is permissible when necessary to pay bank service
charges on that account. Accu rate records must be kept regarding which part of the
funds are the lawyer's.
[3] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be
paid. The lawyer is not required to remit to the client funds that the lawyer reasonably
believes represent fees owed. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client
into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds must be kept in
a trust account, and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the
dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly
distributed.
[4] Paragraph (e) also recognizes that third parties may have lawful claims against
specific fu nds or other property in a lawyer's custody, such as a client's creditor who has
a lien on funds recovered in a personal injury action. A lawyer may have a duty under
applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the
client . In such cases, when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law,
the lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client until the claims are
resolved . A lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the
client and the third party, but, when there are substantial grounds for dispute as to the
person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an action to have a court resolve the
dispute.
[5] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from
activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an
escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the
lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction and is not governed by this
Rule.
[6] A lawyers' fund for client protection provides a means through the collective efforts of
the Bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest
conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fu nd has been established, a lawyer must participate
where it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should participate.
[6a] This Rule is identical to ABA Model Ru le 1.15 except it incorporates two sentences
that were added to the prior version of this Rule in 1997. These two sentences are the
third sentence of paragraph (a) of the Rule and the corresponding fifth sentence of
Comment [1].
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE
OF ABRAHAM C. BATES.

SECOND AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 120905676

Judge Todd Shaughnessy

This matter came before the court for a bench trial pursuant to Rule 14-511 (e) of
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") on May 6 through 8, 2014. The
Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct was represented by Todd Wahlquist.
Respondent Abraham Bates was represented by Michael Skolnick and Kirk Gibbs. The
court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 16, 2014. Thereafter,
both parties filed motions to amend the findings, which were fully briefed and heard by
the court on December 11, 2014, and a subsequent hearing was held on February 13,
2015, at which additional evidence was taken. All amendments to the court's original,
July 16, 2014, findings are indicated below by strikethrough and bold.
Having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court hereby makes
these findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1.

The complaint in this case was brought pursuant to a directive of a Screening

Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, and is based
upon Informal Complaints submitted against Mr. Bates by John Liti and the OPC.

*
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On June 7, 2012, a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee

of the Utah Supreme Court ("the Screening Panel") heard the Liti matter.
3.

At the conclusion of the hearing on June 7, 2012, the Screening Panel

directed the OPC to file a formal complaint against Mr. Bates.
4.

On january i 0, 20i 3, the Screening Panei heard the OPC matter.

5.

At the conclusion of the hearing on January 10, 2013, the Screening Panel

directed the OPC to file a formal complaint against Mr. Bates.
6.

jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 14-511 (a), Rules of

Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
7.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Ruie i 4-5 ii (b) of the RLDD, in

that, at all relevant times, Respondent practiced law in Salt Lake County.

GENERAL BACKGROUND
8.

Mr. Bates is an attorney in the State of Utah and a member of the Utah State

Bar. He was admitted to the Bar on October 20, 2009.
9.

Mr. Bates started a private practice around December 1, 2009, focused

primarily on misdemeanor criminal defense matters using a fixed/flat fee model ·commonly
employed in that practice area.
10.

Mr. Bates' practice expanded rapidly and within six months he had hired

three associate contract attorneys, a paralegal and a law clerk to assist him with a steadily
growing volume of clients. Mr. Bates also expanded his practice area to include consumer
law issues, including bankruptcy and mortgage foreclosure defense. Approximately six
months into practice, on July 1, 2010, Mr. Bates formed Wasatch Advocates, a firm which
he solely owned and operated at an times relevant to the Amended Complaint and unti! the
firm's dissolution on January 31, _2012.
11.

Wasatch Advocates had three primary practice areas: criminal defense,

consumer/individual bankruptcies, and mortgage foreclosure defense. Mr. Bates formed
Wasatch Advocates to provide representation for lower- and middle-income individuals
faced with mortgage foreclosure and who otherwise could not afford the services of private
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counsel. Wasatch Advocates' standard fee agreement provided prospective clients with a
fixed/flat fee option in addition to a traditional retainer/hourly billing option. The
overwhelming majority of Wasatch Advocates clients elected the fixed/flat fee option and
made initial down payments, and subsequent monthly payment plan payments in amounts
that rarely exceeded $2,500.00.
BANGERTER MATTER
FINDINGS OF FACT

12.

Grant Bangerter first retained Wasatch Advocates to represent Rimroc

Properties and Development, LLC ("Rimroc"), a real estate investment company of which
he was a member.

13.

Wasatch Advocates' engagement was to attempt to set aside a default

judgment taken against certain members of Rimroc in a case pending in federal court (the
"Rimroc Case").
14.

In the Rimroc Case, Mr. Bangerter and two other members of Rimroc failed

to disclose their bankruptcy filings.
15.

When Wasatch Advocates learned of the bankruptcies from the FDIC's

opposition to the Rule 60(b) motion filed on Rimroc's behalf, Wasatch Advocates advised
Mr. Bangerter of the inherent conflict of interest which existed between bankrupt and nonbankrupt members.
16.

After the conflict was disclosed, Mr. Bangerter and other Rimroc members

failed to respond to Wasatch Advocates' further communications and requests to discuss
the conflict and possible resolution.
17.

Wasatch Advocates moved to withdraw from the .Rimroc Case. The court

granted Wasatch Advocates'

motion

and Wasatch

Advocates disengaged from

representation.
18.

In the same timeframe, Mr. Bangerter separately retained Wasatch

Advocates to represent him in lawsuit against a lender ING.
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ING held a secured interest in real property located in Cedar Hills, Utah

which was owned by Mr. Bangerter ("Cedar Hills Property").
20.

The Cedar Hills Property was also subject to a secured claim arising from

Rimroc-related loans.
21.

Mr. Bangerter had last made payment on the Cedar Hills Property in

February 2010.
22.

Mr. Bangerter hired Wasatch Advocates to forestall ING's foreclosure sale,

scheduled for March 17, 2011.
23.

An initial complaint and motion for TRO were drafted and filed in Fourth

District Court by Wasatch Advocates. The Complaint in the Fourth District Case bears Mr.
Bates' name on the caption and attached his digital signature. Mr. Bates claims this was
done without his knowledge or approval; whether that is true or not is irrelevant since Mr.
Bates is responsible for all pleadings and papers filed with the court on his behalf, as
explained in more detail below.

24.

Attorneys at Wasatch Advocates other than Mr. Bates had primary

responsibility for the representation of Mr. Bangerter.
25.

Mr. Edwards and Ms. Jones of Wasatch Advocates appeaied at the TRO

hearing on behalf of Mr. Bangerter. The court granted Mr. Bangerter's motion for TRO,
thereby forestalling the foreclosure sale and accomplishing the primary purpose for which
Mr. Bangerter retained Wasatch Advocates.
26.

A subsequent preliminary injunction order was conditioned on payment of a

$26,000 bond. Mr. Bangerter was advised of the requirement that he post this bond as a
condition of the issue of a preliminary injunction. Mr. Bangerter failed to respond to
attempts by VVasatch .A.dvocates to communicate with him by written letters, emails and by
telephone.
27.

ivir. Bangerter testified the bond vvas only $9,000 and that he paid that

amount. That testimony is not credible. There is no evidence in the Fourth District Court's

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF ABRAHAM C. .BATES

Page 5 of 27

120905676

docket suggesting that the bond was only $9,000, nor any evidence that Mr. Bangerter
posted that amount or any other amount.
28.·

Because Mr. Bangerter failed to post the required bond, the preliminary

injunction did not issue, leaving ING free to foreclose on the Cedar Hills Property. Neither
Mr. Bates nor any other Wasatch Advocates' attorney is responsible for Mr. Bangerter's
failure to post the required bond.
29.

ING subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice.

30.

ING's motion to dismiss with prejudice argued, inter alia, that Mr. Bangerter's

claims were judicially estopped based upon his failure to schedule them in his Chapter 7
bankruptcy case.
31.

Mr. Bangerter did not schedule claims related to the Cedar Hills property in

his Chapter 7 bankruptcy. He received a discharge in February 2011 and his bankruptcy
case was closed.
32.

On or about May 23, 2011, Wasatch Advocates attempted to contact Mr.

Bangerter by email regarding his failure to make required payments to the firm. Mr.
Bangerter claims he did not receive this email. That testimony is not credible.
33.

In a letter dated May 25, 2011 Wasatch Advocates attempted to

communicate with Mr. Bangerter regarding the status of the case and his failure to pay
remaining fee obligations owed under Wasatch Advocates' fee agreement.
34.

Wasatch Advocates' May 25 letter notified Mr. Bangerter Wasatch Advocates

would take whatever further action necessary to terminate his legal representation if he did
· not pay fees to which he had agreed.
35.

Mr. Bangerter received the May 25 letter, despite having testified before the

screening panel that he did not. Mr. Bangerter's credibility is undermined by his conflicting
testimony.
36.

Mr. Bangerter did not respond to the May 25 letter. He not make any

additional payment to the firm after receipt of the May 25 letter, despite being in arrears
under his fee agreement.

•
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF ABRAHAM C. BATES

120905676

37.

Page 6 of 27

On or about June 3, 2011, Wasatch Advocates filed a memorandum

in

opposition to the motion to dismiss.
38.

On or about June 10, 2011, Wasatch Advocates filed a motion to withdraw.

ING objected to the withdrawal. On July 11, 2011, the court denied Wasatch Advocates'
motion to withdraw, based on the lack of any substantive basis and potentiai prejudice to
judicial process and ING.
39.

Oral argument on the motion was scheduled for July 29, 2011.

40.

in mid-July, about a week before the scheduied hearing, the itVasatch

Advocates attorney who had been handling Mr. Bangerter's matter abruptly left the firm.
41.

When Mr. Bangerter's case was filed in March 2011, Mr. Bangerter provided

Wasatch Advocates with a loan history ending in October 2010. The loan history he
provided stated he filed a bankruptcy petition in October 2010 for the purpose of
forestalling a scheduled trustee's sale on the property. Mr. Bangerter admitted he did not
inform anyone at Wasatch Advocates that he had further pursued his bankruptcy petition.
He did not think he needed to discuss that with Wasatch Advocates.
42.

On July 21, 2011, Mr. Bates' paralegal _sent him an email informing him that

the court had denied the motion to withdraw in Mr. Bangerter's case and that oral
argument on the pending motion to dismiss was scheduled for July 29, 2011.
43.

On July 21, 2011, Mr. Bates attempted to get a former associate from his

firm to handle the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The former associate was unwilling or
unable to cover the hearing.
44.

On July 28, 2011, the day before the hearing, Mr. Bates instructed his

paralegal to contact opposing counsel and make arrangements to dismiss Mr. Bangertei's
· case. The timing and circumstances suggest that Mr. Bates did so because he was either
unable or unwilling to attend the hearing on July 29, 2011.
45.

Mr. Bates' paralegal, on his behalf, proposed that the case be dismissed

without prejudice. ING's counsel understandably refused to agree to a dismissal without
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prejudice, because doing so would mean Mr. Bangerter could simply re-file the case and
start over again. ING's counsel appropriately insisted upon a dismissal with prejudice.
46.

Mr. Bates' paralegal prepared an email to opposing counsel and appended a

stipulation and order for dismissal of the case without prejudice. Opposing counsel made
clear ING would not agree to a dismissal without prejudice and revised the stipulation and
order to reflect a dismissal with prejudice and returned it to Mr. Bates' paralegal.
47.

Mr. Bates' paralegal filed with the court the stipulation and proposed form of

order dismissing the case with prejudice. Mr. Bates electronically signed the stipulation.
48.

The July 29, 2011, hearing did not go forward and, on August 15, 2011 , the

court entered the stipulated order dismissing with prejudice Mr. Bangerter's claims.
49.

Mr. Bates did not communicate with Mr. Bangerter prior to stipulating to a

dismissal of his case. Mr. Bates acknowledged that the case should not have been
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, absent advance consultation with Mr. Bangerter.
50.

Mr. Bates' primary defense to this alleged rule vioiation is his claim that he

was unaware of the change that had been made to the stipulation whereby the case was
dismissed with prejudice as opposed to without prejudice. Mr. Bates testified to this effect
at trial. Mr. Bates' paralegal could not recall discussing this change with Mr. Bates. Thus,
there is credible evidence that Mr. Bates did not know of the content of the stipulation.
However, even if Mr. Bates was entirely unaware of the content of the stipulation, that fact
is irrelevant.
51.

Mr. Bates' argument implicitly suggests that there is a difference between an

electronic signature that is appended to a document upon filing it with the court and a
manual or wet signature appended by the attorney prior to filing. Mr. Bates seems to
suggest that' because opposing counsel revised his paralegal's stipulation, and his
paralegal then .appended his electronic signature to the document without consulting him,
he is somehow absolved of the consequences of having signed the document. But an
electronic signature is for all intents and for all purposes the exact same as a wet signature

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF ABRAHAM C. BATES
120905676

Page 8 of 27

and an electronic signature carries with it all of the same legal consequences of a manual
signature.
52.

In other words, if Mr. Bates had asked his paralegal to prepare a stipulation

for dismissal without prejudice and she instead prepared a stipulation for dismissal with
prejudice (or if Mr. Bates thought opposing counsel had prepared a stipulation and order
for dismissal without prejudice but instead prepared documents dismissing the case with
prejudice), and Mr. Bates manually signed those documents without reading them, he
would nevertheless be fully responsible for the content of those documents and could not
properly blame his paralegal (or opposing counsel). This is exactly what occurred. Mr.
Bates "signed" the documents when they were electronically filed using his efiling account
and there is no evidence that Mr. Bates ever read them prior to doing so. And whether or
not Mr. Bates had an office policy requiring that nothing be filed without him first reviewing
it is likewise irrelevant - an attorney is responsible for the content of court-filed documents
on which the attorney's signature appears, whether that signature is wet or electronic. 1

53.

Mr. Bates does not claim that his efiling account was hacked nor does he

claim that his paralegal forged his signature or otherwise acted without any authority from
him. Mr. Bates authorized the filing of the documents, and appending his electronic
signature to them. He just failed to read them before doing so.

54.

Mr. Bangerter was not harmed or prejudiced in any way by the dismissal of

his case because the claims asserted therein were meritless. Mr. Bangerter's prior
bankruptcy filing was fatal to his assertion of the claims in that case. Cf. Bishop v. lnwest
Title Services, Inc., 2014 UT App 134,

1l 7

(in an effort to avoid bankruptcy bar, borrower

unsuccessfully argued the claim did not accrue until after bankruptcy filing and therefore
1
The court understands that lawyers can and frequently do reiy on non-iawyer assistants to handle
the mechanics of electronic filing, and nothing herein is intended to suggest that doing so is in any way
improper. However, lawyers can and must ensure that their electronic signature is not used without their
authority and must understand that they a;e responsible for the content of ever/thing filed with the court that
bears their signature, be it electronic or wet. Indeed, the court's electronic filing system depends on an
electronic and wet signatures being treated exactly the same. Considerable mischief would be created if
lawyers - or declarants, who can append electronic signatures to declarations made under penalty of perjury
- could avoid responsibility for the content of electronically-filed documents bearing their signature.
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was not required to be scheduled; borrower did not even attempt to argue bankruptcy bar
did not apply). Additionally, the primary purpose of his hiring of Wasatch Advocates had
been accomplished earlier, when he was granted a TRO that resulted in the cancellation of
the trustee's sale. Mr. Bangerter's unwillingness or inability to post the required bond was
the reason a preliminary injunction was not entered.
55.

After learning that his case had been dismissed, Mr. Bangerter retained Tara

Jones to represent him in the matter. Ms. Jones filed a motion, on behalf of Mr. Bangerter,
based on Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in which she argued, among
other things, that Mr. Bates had filed a dismissal with prejudice based upon a "fraud upon
the court." The motion alternatively argued that equity required the Court to set aside the
dismissal. The motion did not argue mistake or inadvertence.
56.

Ms. Jones did not consult with Mr. Bates prior to filing her Rule 60(b) motion

to gain an understanding of the events leading up to the dismissal of Mr. Bangerter's case.
57.

In a declaration filed by Mr. Bangerter in connection with the Rule 60(b)

motion he stated: "Wasatch Advocates sent me one letter, but to my recollection there
were no further phone calls or emails. The letter, to my understanding, asked me if I
wanted to pay more money to continue with the case.

However, I did not understand

specifically what Wasatch Advocates was asking to continue with on the case and
therefore, I did not do anything further with the letter."
58.

The net effect of Mr. Bangerter's motion was charging Mr. Bates with having

committed a fraud upon the court.
59.

The May 25 letter states, in part, "if the fees of $1 ,000 a month are not

brought current within ten days (2 payments have been missed and you presently owe
$2,000, with another month soon to be due) we will take that to mean you have no interest
in going forward and we will take withdraw [sic] and take whatever further action necessary
to terminate your legal representation. Opposing Counsel filed a motion to dismiss with a
response due by May 31, 2011 so please govern yourself accordingly." Mr. Bangerter's
statement in his declaration that he did not know "what Wasatch Advocates was asking" is
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not accurate; Mr. Bangerter knew or should have known what Wasatch Advocates was
requesting - that he bring his account current. He likewise knew, or should have known,
that his case_would potentially be dismissed if he did not at least contact Wasatch
Advocates to discuss it.

60.

Mr. Bangerter testified that at this point, he had paid \Nasatch Advocates

$1,600 for a loan audit, a set of TRO/preliminary papers, a complaint, and at least one
court appearance to obtain injunctive relief. Evidence in Wasatch Advocates' file
suggested Mi. Bangertei may have paid \Nasatch Advocates $5,000 fOi representation in
his individual matter. In either event, he had not paid the amount agreed upon in the fee
agreement.
61.

Mr. Bangerter testified he did nothing to respond to the May 25 letter, but

rather chose to ignore it because he felt he should not have to pay Wasatch Advocates
anything further.
62.

ING opposed Mi. Bangerter's Rule 60{b) motion and Mr. Bates supplied an

affidavit whereby he denied Mr. Bangerter's fraud allegation. The affidavit directly
addressed the fraud allegation, based on research Mr. Bates performed after learning he
was accused of fraud on the court.
63.

The Fourth District Court ultimately denied Mr. Bangerter's Rule 60(b) motion

on both fraud and equity bases, finding "Plaintiffs allegations are more appropriate [sic]
litigated in a malpractice action, rather than this case against Defendants ING Bank and
James Woodall."
64.

Had the 60(b) motion been granted, the causes of action alleged by

Bangerter would have belonged not to Mr. Bangerter, but to his chapter 7 trustee.
65.

Even if ING's motion to dismiss with prejudice based on judiciai estoppei was

denied, and the Fourth District Case continued, the claims alleged would not have
belonged to Mr. Bangerter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes the following conclusions
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of law:
66.

Mr. Bates violated Rule 1.4(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by

not obtaining Mr. Bangerter's informed consent prior to dismissing his case. Mr. Bates may
have been justified in withdrawing from the case due to non-payment of fees, and Mr.
Bates may have been hampered in his ability to represent Mr. Bangerter given that Mr.
Bangerter did not respond to the May 25 letter or make any effort to communicate with the
firm regarding the case. Moreoever, had Mr. Bates appeared at the July 29 hearing, Rule
11 likely would have limited his ability to advance some or all of the arguments against
dismissal of the case. However, Mr. Bates did not promptly inform Mr. Bangerter that he
was agreeing to the dismissal of the case. Moreover, Mr. Bates was fully responsible for
the content of documents filed with the court that bore his electronic signature. To the
extent he was unaware of the dismissal with prejudice, it was because he did not read the
documents before they were filed . Mr. Bangerter suffered no harm or prejudice as a result
of this violation, but harm to the client is not required to establish a violation of Rule 1.4(a).
67.

OPC argues that Mr. Bates violated Rule 5.3(b) of the Utah Rules of

Professional Conduct by failing to adequately supervise his paralegal. Rule 5.3(c) states: a
"lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of [a non-lawyer assistant] that would be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a iawyer if: ... the lawyer is
a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is
employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at
a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but_fails to take remedial
action." The court does not find a violation of Rule 5.3(b) for the following reasons:
a)

First, as noted above, Mr. Bates is fully responsible for the content of

documents filed with the court under his signature, and therefore is fully responsible for the
dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Bangerter's case. In other words, what OPC refers to as the
"predicate offense" was committed not by Mr. Bates's paralegal but by Mr. Bates himself.
Resort to the fall back position of failing to adequately supervise his paralegal is therefore
unnecessary.
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Second, in light of this, finding a violation of 5.3(b) would amount to

punishing Mr. Bates· under two different rules for the exact same conduct - filing papers
with the court that dismissed a client's case with prejudice without consulting with the
client.
c)

Third, while Mr. Bates had direct supervisory authority over his paralegal and

was a partner in the firm, OPC has not proven that Mr. Bates was aware of the conduct of
his paralegal "at a time when its consequences [could] be avoided or mitigated but fail[ed]
to take remedial action." Mr. Bates did not become aware of the filing until after Mr.
Bangerter had hired new counsel and a Rule 60(b) motion had already been filed. More
important, it is not clear that any remedial action could have been taken, in light of the lack
of merit of Mr. Bangerter's claims and his inability to. personally pursue them.
68.

Mr. Bates did not violate Rule 1.16(d), as claimed by OPC. Mr. Bates'

representation of Mr. Bangerter was terminated either by the dismissal of Mr. Bangerter's
case, or his retention of another attorney to represent him and file on his behalf a motion in
which he accused Mi. Bates of having committed a fraud on the court. Upon being
accused by his client of fraud, Mr. Bates was entitled (perhaps obligated) to respond. In
particular, Mr. Bates was entitled to inform the court that Mr. Bangerter was advised in
writing what was required of him to continue forward with the case, and that Mr. Bangerter
did not respond. Additionally, given that Mr. Bangerter did not own the claims he was
seeking to have reinstated with his Rule 60(b) motion, Mr. Bates had no obligation to
assist him in that effort.
69.

The OPC expressly abandoned its claim that Mr. Bates vi~lated Rule 5.1 (a)

in connection with his representation of Mr. Bangerter. The . OPC appears to have
abandoned its claim that Mr. Bates violated Rules 1.2(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct in connection with his representation of Mr. Bangerter, including by virtue of the
fact that OPC did not prepare findings or conclusions regarding any purported violation of
this rule. To the extent OPC is claiming violations of this rule, the court finds those

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF ABRAHAM C. BATES
120905676

Page 13 of 27

allegations to be unsupported, including for the reasons set forth in Mr. Bates' proposed
findings and conclusions.

TRUST ACCOUNT MATTER
FINDINGS OF FACT

70.

Between approximately July 2010, and February 2012, Mr. Bates maintained a

firm operating account at Zions Bank.
71.

Between approximately July 2010, and February 2012, Mr. Bates maintained a

separate client trust account at Zions Bank.
72.

All checks written from the client trust account bear the signature of Mr. Bates.

73.

Mr. Bates was the only person authorized to withdraw money from the client

trust account. No one other than Mr. Bates made online transfers into or out of the client trust
account.
74.

The majority of legal fees paid to Wasatch Advocates between July 2010, and

February 2012, were fixed/flat fees that Mr. Bates deemed to be earned upon receipt. Mr.
Bates offered the testimony of an expert, Derk Rasmussen, a certified forensic accountant,
who opined that there was satisfactory documentation to show that the fixed/flat fees paid to
Wasatch Advocates were earned upon receipt. Mr. Rasmussen testified that based on his
review, very few Wasatch Advocates' clients elected the traditional hourly fee option that
Wasatch Advocates offered in its fee agreement.
75.

The majority of those fees were deposited directly into Mr. Bates' operating

account, rather than the client trust account.
76.

At times, whether by mistake or in accordance with an evolving policy on

where fixed/flat fees should be deposited, some earned fixed/flat fees were deposited into
the trust account. Mr. Bates was aware that, at times, fixed/flat fee payments that he
deemed to be earned upon receipt had been deposited into his trust account.
77.

Mr. Bates periodically would transfer funds from his trust account to his

operating account based on his estimation of work that had been performed. The transfers
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made from the trust account to the operating account were typically not associated with a
specific client. In determining how much to transfer, Mr. Bates would consult (a)
QuickBooks "Payments Received" reports for the time period in question, (b)
QuickBooks "Deposit Detail" reports, which included reports by client, (c) weekly
practice management spreadsheets, and (d) bank account records for his operating
account and trust account.

78.
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the ability to say, on any given day, how much money was being held in the trust account
for a particular client. At the same time, Mr. Bates did not have any experience operating a

law firm trust account. He did maintain a widely-used software accounting program to
track all financial activity in the operating account and trust account and to generate
accounting reports and ultimately consulted with an accounting firm. He also
employed individuals with accounting backgrounds to try and ensure his trust and
operating accounts were properly maintained. Despite these efforts, the operation of Mr.
Bates' trust account remained somewhat chaotic.
79.

In the amended complaint, OPC outlines conduct by Mr. Bates generally

related to depositing legal fees paid by clients to the firm's operating account (presumably
instead of the trust account). As the court understands it, OPC was claiming that Mr. Bates
had depos.ited in the firm's operating account unearned client fees that should have been
deposited in the trust account Mr. Bates presented evidence that his "office policy" was to
treat any fee payments equal to or less than $2,500 as earned upon receipt. The OPC
does not appear to take issue with Mr. Bates' claim that treating these amounts as earned
upon receipt does not amount to a per se vioiation of Ruie ·J.15. To the extent OPC is
claiming a per se violation of the rule on this basis, the court finds that OPC has not met its
burden of proof. Thus, insofar as the trust account matters are concerned, the only items
that are the subject of the OPC's claims are: (i) the Silver Stream Enterprises'
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transactions, (ii) the Pennington transactions, (iii) the FA Apartments' transactions, and (iv)
the John Liti transactions.

Silver Stream Enterprises' Transaction

80.

Wasatch Advocates employed the services of a third party vendor called

Silver Stream Enterprises ("Silver Stream") to perform loan modification services on behalf
of some of its foreclosure defense clients.
81.

On June 28, 2011, Wasatch Advocates issued a check from the trust

· account in the amount of $3,000 payable to Silver Stream for loan modification services
rendered on behalf of ten separate Wasatch Advocates' clients.
82.

At the time the ·check was written, none of the ten clients on whose behalf

the check was written had money that was being held in the trust account. Each of the ten
clients had made small payments in the previous thirty days ranging between $250-$500
under fixed/flat fee agreements providing for loan modification services. The fees were
deposited into Wasatch Advocates' operating account instead of the trust account.
83.

Mr. Bates testified that he thought at the time the check was issued that the

payments totaling $3,000 made by these clients in June had been deposited by Wasatch
Advocates' receptionist into the firm's trust account. Mr. Bates believed this to be the case
in part because he had recently trained his staff that any payments made by homeowners
for "mortgage relief assistance" must be deposited in the firm 's trust account (and not its

operating account) in order to comply with recently-enacted statute statutes and federal
regulations governing such fee payments.
84.

Mr. Bates admits that this check should not have been written from the trust

account and claims this was a mistake. It does not appear that Mr. Bates or Wasatch
Advocates ever benefitted financially from this transaction, which supports Mr. Bates'
contention that this was an accounting mistake.
85.

Mr. Bates primary defense to this claim is that as of June 28, 2011, he had

deposited and was holding in the trust account earned fees in amounts well in excess of
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the $3,000 check to Silver Stream. Therefore, while the firm never deposited funds in the
trust account on behalf of these clients, the total balance in the trust account exceeded the
total amount necessary to cover amounts held in trust for all of Wasatch Advocates'
clients. Therefore, according to Mr. Bates, the payment of this check did not cause
Wasatch Advocates to draw upon client trust funds being held for another client. OPC
does not appear to dispute disputes this. The this fact, though given the manner in which
the trust account records were maintained it-would be difficult to makes it difficult if not
impossible to make this determination. The trust account had a positive balance on
June 28, 2011, but of course that does not necessarily mean that there were
sufficient funds to cover all trust deposits of all clients as of June 28, 2011. Based
on the evidence presented, the court cannot find that the $3,000 check caused the
trust account to go out of balance on or immediately after June 28, 2011, the date of
the check; subject, however, to the discussion of the F.A. Apartments transactions,
discussed below. With respect to the operating account - the account from which
the check shouid have been written since the client deposits were made into this
account - the balance was almost $40,000 on June 28, 2011, well in excess of what
was needed to cover the check had it been written from this account instead of the
trust account.

Pennington Transaction
86.

On October 10, 2011, Wasatch Advocates issued a check in the amount of

$2,325.90 from the trust account to "Client Pennington" for "refunded legal fees" as
indicated by the memo line on the check.
87.

None of the !ega! fees paid to Wasatch Advocates by "Client Pennington"

had been deposited into the trust account. Therefore "Client Pennington" had no funds in
the trust account at the time the check was wiitten.
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Mr. Bates does not dispute OPC's claim that the Penningtons did not have

any fees in the trust account on October 10, 2011, and that the refund check was
mistakenly issued from the trust account rather than the operating account.
89.

As with the Silver Stream transaction, Mr. Bates maintains that, as of

October 10, 2011, June 28, 2011, he had in the trust account earned fees well in excess of
the $2,300 refund check. So, once again, Mr. Bates maintains that no other client trust
funds were used to pay this check. And, once again, OPC Eioes not appear to dispute
disputes this. The fact but it is difficult to verify given the manner in which Wasatch

Advocates maintained the account makes it difficult if not impossible to verify. The
trust account had a positive balance on October 10, 2011, but of course that does
not necessarily mean that there were sufficient funds to cover all trust deposits of
all clients as of October 10, 2011. Based on the evidence presented, the court
cannot find that the $2,300 check caused the trust account to go out of balance on
or immediately after October 10, 2011, the date of the check; subject, however, to
the discussion of the F.A. Apartments transactions discussed below. As with the
Silver Stream transaction, the operating account - the account from which the
check should have been written - had a balance of over $20,000 on October 10,
2011, well in excess of what was needed to cover the check had it been written from
this account instead of the trust account.
The net effect of the Silver Stream and Pennington transactions was that
$5,300 was paid out of the trust account to·r payment to vendors and for a client
refund, when those amounts should have been paid out of the operating account. In
relation to these transactions, Mr. Bates did not use funds belonging to Silver
Stream or Pennington in a manner not authorized by those clients - on the contrary,
the Silver Stream clients understood these fees would be used to pay a vendor, and
the Pennington funds were refunded to Pennington. Likewise, none of the clients
were harmed by these checks having been written out of the trust account rather
than the operating account. While the court is unable to conclude that these
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transactions caused the trust account balance to fall below the necessary balances
on June 28, 2011, and on October 10, 2011, these· errors and transactions may have
affected the trust account balances related to F.A. Apartments, transactions that
spanned this entire time frame.

FA Apartments' Transaction

90.

On December 10, 2010 Wasatch Advocates received a $28,000 check from

vVasaich Advocates' ciient F.A. Apartments. The $28,000 was deposited into itVasatch
Advocates' trust account.
91.

The F.A. Apartment funds were to be held in trust and only used for certain

expenses authorized by F.A. Apartments. No portion of the $28,000 held in trust was
intended to be used for Mr. Bates' legal fees. According .to F.A. Apartment's principal, the
$28,000 was to be used for payment of certain costs, including local counsel fees, utility
bills, property management expenses, and ivir. Bates' travei costs.
92.

Between December 10, 2010, and September 25, 2011, F.A. Apartments

authorized various expenditures from the $28,000 in the trust account. It is undisputed that

F.A. Apartments did not authorize these funds to be used for purposes not authorized
byit.

93.

Those expenditures are detailed on Defendant's Trial Ex. 82, BATES001401.

Mark Berrett of F.A. Apartments testified that FA Apartments authorized Wasatch Advocates
to make each of these payments, totaling $20,678.59, which reduced the balance from
$28,000 to $7,321.41. In addition, at least $1,206.30 in additional expenses related to the
representation of F.A. Apartments was incurred by the firm. · to these, t'No payments

totaling $3,206.30 were made from the operating account (but which should have been
dravm on the trust account). So, of the $28,000, FA Apartments authorized Wasatch
Advocates to pay all but $4,115.11 of that amount.
93(a).

OPC first focuses on January 3, 2011, correctly pointing out the

following: (1) The trust account balance on January 3, 2011, was $22,792.36 so el/en

•
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if all of the money in the trust account was for F.A. Apartments, the amount being
held was $5,207.64 less than the original $28,000. (2) As of that date, F.A.
Apartments had authorized the firm to pay $3,206.38 in F.A. Apartment expenses. (3)
So on January 3, 2011, Mr. Bates was out of trust with F.A. Apartments in the
amount of $2,001.26. However, the court notes that the daily balance in the trust
account during the month of January 2011 covers a broad range - from a low of
$22,792.36 on January 3 {the date selected by OPC) to a high of $45,074.36 on
January 20.
93(b ).

OPC next focuses on March 17, 2011, correctly pointing out the

following: (1) The trust account balance on March 17, 2011, was $8,926.83. (2) As of
that date, F.A. Apartments had authorized the firm to pay $16,729.19 . in F.A.
Apartment expenses. (3) Deducting these expenses from the original $28,000 means
there should have been $11,270.81 in trust for F.A. Apartments, but the total balance
as noted above was $8,926.83, a difference of $2,343.98. Mr. Bates was therefore out
of trust with F.A. Apartments on March 17, 2011, and the amount by which he was
out of trust was $342.72 more than it was on January 3, 2011. Again, the daily
balance in the trust account during the month of March 2011 covers a broad range from a low of $8,926.83 on March 17 (the date selected by OPC) to a high of
$45,652.02 ten days earlier on March 7.
93(c).

OPC next focuses on June 30, 2011, correctly pointing out the

following: (1) The trust account balance on June 30, 2011, was $5,351.10. (2) As of
that date, F.A. Apartments had authorized the firm to pay $18,427.10 in F.A.
Apartment expenses. (3) Deducting these expenses from the original $28,000 means
there should have been $9,572.90 in trust for F.A. Apartments, but the total balance
as noted above was $5,351.10, a difference of $4,221.80. Mr. Bates was therefore out
of trust with F.A. Apartments on June 30, 2011, and the amount by which he was out
of trust was $1,877.82 more than it was on March 17, 2011. Once again, the daily
balance in the trust account during the month of June 2011 covers a broad range -

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF ABRAHAM C. BATES

120905676

Page 20 of 27

from a low of $5,351.10 on June 30 (the date selected by OPC) to a high of
$34,039.10 seven days earlier on June 23.

94.

[deleted]

95.

F.A. Apartments asked Wasatch Advocates to prepare a reconciliation of the

•

$28,000 trust deposit to be disclosed to the opposing party as part of settlement negotiations.
However, F.A. Apartments requested that certain of the expenses it had authorized to be
paid not be included on the reconciliation for reasons not relevant to the present dispute. This
reconciliation, showing a balance remaining of $20,179.65, represents the reconciliation that
FA Apartments asked Wasatch Advocates to prepare and is not an accurate or complete
reconciliation of all the payments FA Apartments authorized Wasatch Advocates to pay from

•

the $28,000 trust deposit.
96.

A settlement of the F.A. Apartments matter was reached, which required,

- -- - -- - - - - - - -

among other things, payment of $20,000 based on the reconciliation prepared at F.A.

•

Apartments' direction.
97.

Between July 29, 2011, and August 2, 2011, the principals of F.A. Apartments

paid to Wasatch Advocates and/or Mr. Bates an additional $16,500 retainer that was to be
used for his work on the matter. This $16,500 should have been deposited in the trust
account. All but $500 was mistakenly deposited in the operating account; tt--wa&--Het,.
despite Mr. Bates' direction that these funds it-be deposited in the trust account, $16,000 of
the $16,500 i-t---was mistakenly deposited into the operating account. The $16,000 $16,500

represented unearned fees at the time it was deposited into the operating account.
98.

About a month later, on or about August 23, 2011 , Mr. Bates learned the

$16,000 aOO had been mistakenly deposited in the operating account rather than the trust

account. On or about August 24, 2011 , Mr. Bates and F.A. Apartments agreed that instead of
using the $16,000 aOO retainer for Mr. Bates' legal fees, that amount would be applied toward
certain · of the expenses that had originally been debited against the $28,000 in trust.
However, the $16,000 WQ was not transferred to the trust account at that time and remained
in the operating account.

•
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99.

As of September 16, 2011, Mr. Bates should have been holding in the trust

account at least $20,000 belonging to F.A. Apartments, ei#lef from the residue of the
$28,000 originally placed in the trust account GF--in combination with the $16,500 retainer,
$16,000 of which was mistakenly deposited into the operating account and wrueh should

have been transferred to the trust account.
100.

On September 16, 2011, Mr. Bates' total trust account balance was $3,335.73.

On September 16, 2011, Mr. Bates transferred $20,000 from his operating account to
his payroll account, leaving the operating account with a negative balance of $454.94.
Following the transfer, the payroll account balance was $27,278.67. At the time of the

September 16 transfer, F.A. Apartments had $16,000 in Mr. Bates operating account
(which should have been in his trust account). As a result of the September 16
transfer, all of those funds were transferred to Mr. Bates' payroll account and appear
to have been used for the firm's payroll. On September 19 and again on September 21,
2011, Mr. Bates drew on a line of credit and transferred to the operating account
$5,000 and $7,000. Mr. Bates had previously established a line of credit or revolving
loan from his wife or himself and he periodically put money into the operation of the
law firm through this loan or line of credit when the cash flow needs of the finn
required it. By September 28, 2011, the balance of the operating account had
increased to $76,623.21.

101.

On September 26, 2011, a series of deposits were made into Mr. Bates' trust

account representing payments from various clients. According to Mr. Bates, these
represented fees that the firm had earned upon receipt (but which nevertheless were
deposited in the trust account). Also on September 26, 2011, Mr. Bates transferred $10,000
from the operating account to the trust account to facilitate a wire transfer on behalf of F.A.
Apartments. Prior to this, Mr. Bates had not made any transfers of F.A. Apartments' funds
from the operating account to the trust account.
102.

On September 27, 2011, Mr. Bates wired $20,000 from the trust account for

the F.A. Apartments' settlement. At or around this time, it appears Mr. Bates'
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"
representation of F.A. Apartments concluded. That representation concluded to the
satisfaction of all parties. F.A. Apartments did not and has not raised any concerns
with Mr. Bates' representation of it. Likewise, F.A. Apartments did not and has not
raised any issues with Mr. Bates accounting for the money it paid to him (in trust or
otherwise), Mr. Bates' payment of various bills on behalf of F.A. Apartments, or
amounts Mr. Bates billed for his services or costs.
103.
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that on this date Wasatch Advocates client John Liti's tax return totaling $2,980.80 should
have been in vVasatch Advocates' trust account. Mr. Bates testified that when he wired the
$20,000 he was unaware Mr. Liti's tax return had been deposited in Wasatch Advocates'
trust account in March 2011. The court accepts as accurate Mr. Bates testimony that he
did not wire the $20,000 knowing that any portion thereof represented client funds held in
tiList for the benefit of another client or a third person. Although he may not have intended
it, that clearly is what occurred.
104.

[deleted; as it pertains to sanctions phase].

105.

[deleted; as it pertains to sanctions phase].

John Liti Transaction
106.

In or about October 2010, John Liti hired Wasatch Advocates to represent him

in a bankruptcy matter. That representation continued until approximately July 31, 2011.
From October 2010 until July 31, 2011, the Wasatch Advocates' attorney assigned to Mr.
Liti's case was Jennifei Smock.

During this time period Mr. Bates never appeared as

counsel of record for Mr. Liti, nor was he familiar with Mr. Liti's case;
107.

Mr. Liti paid $1,275 to Wasatch Advocates for legal fees and filing fees

associated with his bankruptcy case.
108.

As part of the bankruptcy, Mr. Liti was required to turn over at least a portion of

his 201 O tax refund to the bankruptcy trustee. On March 12, 2011 Mr. Liti delivered to

•
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Wasatch Advocates a $2,980.80 check representing his tax refund . On March 23, 2011,
the check was deposited into Wasatch Advocates' trust account.
109.

No portion of the $2,980.80 was for legal fees or services owed to Wasatch

Advocates.
110.

Ms. Smock left Wasatch Advocates effective July 31, 2011. Ms. Smock's

resignation email advised Wasatch Advocates of certain funds being held in trust for a
debt negotiation client, but did not advise Wasatch Advocates of funds being held in trust
for any other client, including Mr. Liti. Ms. Smock took with her Mr. Liti's file and continued
to represent him.
111.

On September 27, 2011, Mr. Bates wired $20,000 from the client trust account

on behalf FA Apartments. After the wire transfer, the balance in Mr. Bates' client trust
account was $497.73. As of that date, Mr. Bates and Wasatch Advocates should have been
holding in the trust account the $2,980.80 deposited by Mr. Liti.
112.

Mr. Bates acknowledges Mr. Uti's tax refund should have been in Wasatch

Advocates' trust account on September 27, 2011, after he wired from the trust account
$20,000 on_behalf of FA Apartments, but that it was not.
113.

On December 2, 2011, Ms. Smock wrote a letter to Wasatch Advocates, c/o

Wasatch Advocates COO, Blynn Simmons. Ms. Smock advised Wasatch Advocates that
the bankruptcy trustee in Mr. Liti's case had filed a Motion to Turn Over Property, which
sought "the 201 O tax refund of your client Mr. Liti." Ms. Smock's letter directed that
$1,589.19 be paid to the trustee.
114.

On December 9, 2011, Ms. Simmons delivered to the trustee a check drawn

on the trust account in the requested amount of $1,589.19.
11 5.

In a letter dated December 23, 2011 , to Ms. Smock, Mr. Liti's attorney-of-

record, Ms. Simmons on behalf of Wasatch Advocates offered to refund the balance of Mr.
Liti's tax refund. Ms. Simmons requested that Ms. Smock respond with a written
acknowledgement authorizing the firm to release the funds to Mr. Liti.
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116.

Ms. Smock responded by letter dated December 27, 2011. Ms. Smock

advised Ms. Simmons to return to Mr. Liti the balance of his tax refund.

117.

Mr. Liti's funds were not returned at that time.

118.

Mr. Bates was out of town on vacation during the time these exchanges were

taking place. When Mr. Bates returned in early January 2012, Ms. Simmons had quit
Wasatch Advocates. Mr. Bates claims he was unaware of the communications between
Ms. Smock and Ms. Simmons regarding Mr. Liti's funds that were still in the firm's
possession.

119.

After he returned in early January 2012, Mr. Bates began the process of

winding down V\Jasatch Advocates. That included closing its operating and trust accounts.
Mr. Bates dissolved the firm effective January 31, 2012.
120.

At the time he dissolved the firm, Mr. Bates was holding funds in trust for a

few clients. Prior to transferring funds from his Wasatch Advocates accounts to his new
accounts, Mr. Bates attempted to identify all of the funds he was holding in trust and to whom
those funds beionged. ivir. Bates did not identify any funds being held in trust as belonging to
Mr. Liti.
121.

As of the time Mr. Bates transferred the funds he was holding in trust from

his old accounts to his new accounts, the $1,391.61 belonging to Mr. Liti was gone.
122.

Mr. Bates acknowledges that the $1,391.61 should have been in Wasatch

Advocates' trust account when the trust account was closed, but it was not.
123.

Mr. Bates testified he first became aware that Mr. Liti was claiming he was

owed money from Wasatch Advocates' trust account in approximately March, 2012 when
the OPC served Mr. Bates with a copy of Mr. Liti's January 11, 2012 Bar compliant, and
OPC's request for information relating thereto.

124.

The amount claimed in Mr. Liti's Bar complaint differs from the amount

actually deposited in the trust account. Additionaiiy, the ledger entry foi Mi. Liti's deposit
does not clearly identify what the funds are and what they are for.

•
•
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Mr. Bates testified that it was not until Ms. Smock and Mr. Liti testified at the

Screening Panel hearing that he understood the particulars of the amounts owing to Mr.
Liti. Mr. Bates paid the amounts owed to Mr. Liti after the Screening Panel hearing.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes the following conclusions
of law:
126.

With respect to the Silver Stream transaction:

a)

To the extent OPC is claiming Mr. Bates misappropriated client funds in

violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, OPC has not met its
burden of proving the same. The money these clients paid to Wasatch Advocates was
used by the firm exactly as the clients understood it would be used - to pay a
vendor for services associated with the legal representation. Mr. Bates was not
holding these funds in trust for a client but was paying a vendor for services
provided to the client. Paying a vendor is not a misappropriation or misuse of the
client's funds. Additionally, OPC has not shown that the issuance of the $3,000 check
on June 28, 2011, by itself, caused Mr. Bates to invade any amounts held in trust for
other clients. ; rather, Mr. Bates appears to have had in the account at the time funds he
determined had been earned that were in excess of the $3,000 check. 2
b)

However, under Rule 1.15(a), a lawyer must maintain "[c]omplete records of

such account funds ... " which the comment explains as follows: "A lawyer should maintain
on a current basis books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting
practice and comply with any recordkeeping rules established by law or court order." It
does not appear to the court that Mr. Bates had any way of readily determining exactly

2
The court does not understand OPC to be claiming a violation of Rule 1.15(b), which prohibits a
lawyer from depositing the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account, except as may be necessary to pay
bank service charges on the account. The court therefore does not consider this issue.
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how much was being held in his trust account for any given client. 3 If he had such records,
he or his staff wou ld have been able to quickly and easily determine that the Silver Stream
clients did not have any funds in the trust account and therefore the check should not have
been issued from this account. The court therefore concludes that Mr. Bates failed to
maintain adequate records as required by Rule 1.15(a).
127.

With respect to the Pennington transaction, the court reaches the same

conclusions of law as it did with the Silver Stream transaction, and for the same reasons,
as explained above.
128.

With respect to the FA Apartments' transaction:

a)

Mr. Bates violated Rule 1.15(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by

failing to hold funds belonging to FA Apartments in an account separate from his own
account; failing adequately to safeguard FA Apartments' funds; and failing to keep earned
fees separate from unearned fees.
b)

[deleted; as it pertains to sanctions phase].

129.

With respect to the transactions involving Mr. Liti:

a)

Mr. Bates violated Rule 1.15(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by

failing to safeguard Mr. Liti's property; failing to hold Mr. Liti's funds in his trust account; and
using those funds for some other purpose.
b)

Mr. Bates violated Rule 1.15(d) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by

failing to promptly deliver to Mr. Liti the remaining portion of his tax refund when he learned
the money was supposed to be in his account.
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Mr. Bates'
misconduct and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, IT IS HEREBY
Ut-<Ul::Rt::D I HA I :
3
Mr. Bates' expert, Mr. Rasmussen, offered the general opinion that he was able to do a forensic
accounting of Mr. Bates' accounts and was able to determine, in that setting, where the funds came from,
wliere they were deposited, and how they were used. That appears to be true as far as it goes. However, Mr.
Rasmussen did not offer the opinion that he or anyone else would have been able to determine, at any given
moment in time, exactly how much of the total funds being held in trust represented funds being held for
each individual client.
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This matter be set pursuant to Rule 14-511 (f) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability for a sanctions hearing. At the sanctions hearing, as appropriate, the court
will consider relevant evidence of aggravation and mitigation of Mr. Bates' misconduct.
The court will then impose the appropriate sanction for Mr. Bates' professional
misconduct as governed by the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
The foregoing constitutes the order of the court on the matters presented, and no
additional or further order is required to be prepared.
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2014.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN O1 2015
Salt Lake County

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR13y:~::------=----IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DeputyClerk

In the Matter of the Discipline of
Abraham C. Bates #12440,
Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PERTAINING TO SANCTIONS
PHASE

Case No.120905676
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy

On April 15, 2015 the court conducted a one-pay bench trial regarding the
sanctions phase of this disciplinary proceeding. The OPC was represented by Todd
Wahlquist.

Respondent Abraham C. Bates ("Bates") was represented by Michael F.

Skolnick and Kirk G. Gibbs. The court previously heard in May 2014 the violations
phase of this case and entered its Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
'

'

of Law, which _are incorporated by reference to the extent necessary. Having received
the parties' evidence and having heard argument from counsel, the Court hereby enters
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law Pertaining to Sanctions Phase:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The OPC's recommended sanction, disbarment, is not appropriate in this

case. Considering all the evidence received by the court, the only matter upon which
disbarment could possibly be based is the F.A. Apartments ("FA") matter. Conduct
related to the Liti matter does not give rise to disbarment and for the reasons detailed in

•
this findings and on the record in this matter the OPC's argument that disbarment is
necessary based on the FA matter gives this court serious pause.
2.

Although not required for disbarment, it is significant that FA suffered no

harm, monetary or otherwise.

FA made no complaint to the Bar or anyone else

regarding any aspect of Bates' representation of FA. Instead, FA principal Mark Berrett,
a Certified Professional Accountant by profession, testified he was completely satisfied
with Bates' representation of FA and that Bates made continuous efforts to
communicate with him regarding the accounting on FA's trust deposit.

Mr. Berrett

offered no testimony adverse to Bates.
3.

The court understands that imposition of a sanction, including disbarment,

does not necessarily turn on a client's satisfaction or whether or not the client fiied a Bar
complaint. Nevertheless, the fact that the client testified it was completely satisfied with
the representation, that it found no reason to file a complaint with the Bar, and that after
all of the events came to light it still maintains that the lawyer provided the services
requested in the manner requested, without any harm to the client, seriously
undermines the OPC's contention that a sanction amounting to professional death
penalty is warranted.
4. With respect to the spe_cific individual matters before the Court:
(a)

Bangerter ("OPC") matter:

Bates' conduct was negligent.

Bangerter suffered no harm and the conduct in question is consistent with the
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five private admonitions Bates received for conduct that transpired during the
same timeframe as the conduct before the Court. In other words, the Bangerter
matter involved the same type of circumstances and conduct as those contained
in the admonitions submitted to the Court by the OPC. Therefore, standing on its
own, the rule violation involved in the Bangerter matter would give rise to the
same sanction as was imposed in the other, similar matters - a private
admonition.
(b)

Silverstream

and

Pennington

matters:

There

was

no

misappropriation of funds in connection with these matters, although accounting
mistakes were involved. Bates' mental state was negligence in that he ultimately
failed to maintain adequate records on these matters despite his efforts to the
contrary. Therefore, similar to the Bangerter matter, a private admonition would
be the appropriate presumptive sanction in the · Silverstream and Pennington
matters.
(c)

Liti matter: The Court finds that disbarment is not an appropriate

presumptive sanction with respect to this matter. OPC failed to meet its burden in
support of its claim that Bates knowingly and intentionally took any money from
Liti with the intent to benefit himself, another, or with any intention to deprive Liti
of his funds. To the extent OPC relies on constructive notice by virtue of Bates
controlling the account in question and withdrawing funds from the account, the
Page-3-
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court does not see how constructive notice creates the specific intent required to
support disbarment.

The conduct in question is somewhat similar to cases

involving trust account overdrafts, and a bookkeeping mistake should not lead to
an attorney's disbarment. Bates' mental state in the Liti matter was negligence.
There was some injury in the amount of approximately $1,500, but Bates did pay
restitution in full once the amount owed to Liti was finally determined at the
screening panel hearing. Mr. Bates probably could have, and probably should
have, refunded the money more promptly than he did, but the court does not find
the delay to be ultimately meaningful to the question presented: The presumptive
discipline in the Liti matter would be a public reprimand.
(d)

FA matter:

It is undisputed that the amount of $16,000.00 was

mistakenly deposited in Wasatch Advocates' operating account, and should have
been deposited into Wasatch Advocates' trust account on behalf of FA. The
main issue in the FA matter relates to Bates' mental state. The OPC has failed
to carry its burden of proving that Bates was aware of the incorrect deposit prior
to August 23, 2011. The undisputed evidence at trial showed that Bates
expressly instructed his staff to deposit the funds into the trust account.
Additionally, the OPC failed to meets its burden of showing Bates knowingly or
intentionally caused the apparent shortfalls in the approximate amount of $2,000
in March or June of 2011 and therefore this conduct also does not constitute
Page-4-

intentional misappropriation. The shortfalls in the trust account were based on
Bates' negligent mental state. It was not until August 23, 2011 , when Bates
informed FA he was about to bill his time for the previous six weeks against the
$16,0000 deposit that Bates learned FA funds were not in trust. On the same
day, Bates' offered to defer billing against this deposit for the client's benefit so
that the funds could be used to fund the settlement in the case. However, based
on the agreement and because Bates did not move those funds back into trust as
of August 23 rd , Bates' conduct from that point forward with respect to the funds
was done knowingly.

On September 16, 2011 a transfer from Wasatch

Advocates' operating account to Wasatch Advocates' payroll account was made.
At the same time, Bates had lines of credit available which significantly exceeded
the amount of the transfer. Evidence was presented that Bates had drawn on
these credit lines on multiple prior occasions - including four times in September
both preceding and following the September 16 payroll transfer - to fund Wasatch
Advocates' operating expenses, including payroll. The OPC has not met its
burden of showing that Bates made the transfer to payroll with the specific intent
to use FA funds to benefit himself, another, or to harm FA. Moreover, FA was not
actually harmed in any way and shortly after the transfer to payroll all of FA's
funds were properly accounted for.

And, as Bates had agreed to do for the

benefit of FA, he deferred billing against the $16,000 deposit until November 15,
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2011 and the settlement in the case was fully and timely funded with the funds
Mr. Bates was holding. Therefore the presumptive sanction for this conduct is
suspension under 14-605(b)(1), which involves knowing but unintentional
misconduct that caused potential harm.
5.

In determining the overall level of discipline the court takes the conduct

resulting in the most serious level of discipline, which in this case is suspension, and
then performs a balancing test in light of any aggravating and mitigating factors
applicable at the time the conduct occurred.
6.

The OPC argued the Court should find three aggravating factors applied

at the time of Bates' misconduct. With respect to OPC's first _claim that Bates has a
prior record of discipline, the Court finds there is no prior record of discipline for the
reasons argued by Bates. All of the conduct at issue in this case occurred during the
same timeframe as the conduct set forth in the five matters submitted to the court by
OPC. The rule in question clearly requires a temporal sequence with respect to a prior
record of discipline -

ie, discipline, awareness of the misconduct and resulting

discipline, and then continued misconduct. That does not exist here. With respect to
OPC's second alleged aggravating factor, the court does find that multiple offenses
occurred involving a pattern of misconduct over the last six months of Wasatch
Advocates' existence. During this period, Wasatch Advocates imploded as a result of a
significant proportion of Bates' staff abruptly leaving the firm, combined with changing
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economic circumstances related to Bates' foreclosure defense practice. Bates did not
dispute that the multiple offenses involving a pattern of misconduct applied to his case.
As to OPC's third alleged aggravating factor, the court concludes OPC failed to carry its
burden in support of its allegations that Bates acted with a dishonest or selfish motive or
that Bates failed to express remorse for his misconduct.
7.

With respect to mitigating factors , Bates argued the court should consider

a total of seven mitigating factors in his favor. First, the court finds that Bates made a
good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his conduct by making restitution to Liti.
Second, the court also finds that Bates has expressed remorse for his actions. Third,
and most significantly, the court finds that the mitigating factor which carries
predominant weight is Bates' inexperience in the practice of law. Bates bit off far more
than he was able to chew in building such a large law firm less than two years out of law
school. The rule violations that occurred in the latter half of 2011 occurred because
Bates was in way over his head in his efforts to expand his firm so quickly and on a
scale which a niore experienced lawyer would have avoided. Fourth, the court finds,
and the OPC does not dispute, that Bates made full disclosure and was cooperative at
all times during these disciplinary proceedings. Fifth, Mr. Bates paid himself a modest
salary and at the end of the day ended up losing a substantial amount of money as a
result of the operation and winding down of Wasatch Advocates. The court cannot find
that Bates had a dishonest or selfish motive for the misconduct involved in this case.
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Sixth, the court finds, and the OPC does not dispute, that Bates had a good reputation
considering he was a second year lawyer. However, the court does not consider Bates'
reputation two years into practice as a significant mitigating factor, given Bates' limited
experience in the practice of law. Similarly, in support of his claim of good character,
Bates offered testimony from two senior members of the Bar who mentored him during
the time period in question.

The OPC did not demonstrate Bates' lack of good

character. However, while the court finds that Bates possessed good character, the
court declines to assign significant weight to Bates' character as a mitigating factor.
Lastly, with respect to interim reform, Bates testified as to the various changes he has
made to his trust accounting procedures since the dissolution of Wasatch Advocates
three years ago, in addition to other operational changes which have reduced the size
and scale of his law practice in the three years after Wasatch Advocates was dissolved.
However, the court declines to make a finding with respect to Bates' interim reform ·
based on lack of sufficient evidence.
The court has weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in connection with
the misconduct-giving rise to a suspension as the presumptive level of discipline. The
court concludes that the balancing test tips in Bates' favor warranting a slight downward
departure from the six-month suspension "generally" imposed under Rule 14-525. The
court therefore concludes, pursuant to Rules 14-604 and 14-524, that a suspension of
five months is appropriate in this case.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Bates shall be suspended from the
practice of law f,or a period of five (5) months. The suspension shall commence on July
1, 2015. During the period of suspension, Mr. Bates is enjoined and prohibited from
practicing law in the State of Utah, holding himself out as an attorney at law, performing
legal services for others, giving legal advice to others, accepting fees for rendering legal
services, or appearing as counsel in any proceeding in any Utah court or before any
Utah administrative body, or holding himself out to others as "Attorney at Law",
"Counselor at Law", "Lawyer", or similar titles.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2015.

Todd M.
aughnessy
District Court Judge .
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Wasatch Advocates
FA Apartments Trust Account

10:39 AM
08/22/11
Cash Basis
Typo

All Transactions
Date

41 00 • Client Trust
4130 • Client Trus t Funds
Invoice
12/1012010
Credit Memo
1/31/2011
Credit Memo
2/2/2011
Credit Memo
2/4/2011
Credit Memo
2/4/2011
Credit Memo
2/4/2011
Credit Memo
2/2212011
Credi! Memo
3/4/2011
Credit Memo
31712011
Credit Memo
3117/2011
Credit Memo
6/712011
Credit Memo
6/7/2011
Credit Memo
6/7/2011
Credit Memo
617/2011
Credit Memo
617/2011
Credit Memo
7/512011
Credit Memo
81412011
Credit Memo
8/16/2011
Total 4130 · Client Trust Funds
Total 4100 • Client Trust
TOTAL

Num

505
543

383
384
385
550
552
598
603
648

859
861
863
866

867
915
967
999

Momo

Funds placed In Trust
Mortensen & Rafle Retainer
Hutchison & Steffen, LLC Retainer Check
Trust Account Check to Temple Ridge Apartments
Cut Trust Check to Temple Ridge to pay NV Power Bill
Retainer to Hutchison & Steffens
Trust Check 1010 lo RGR-SNA Group #2, lie
Phone BIii- Centuryllnk- Trust Check 1011
Management Fees lo Shirley
NV Energy BIii- Trust Check 1015
Credll Bureau Central• NV Ulllllles Invoice 020461-04 Paid v.ilh Trust Check# 1025
ADT Security Services Inc, Account 187729898 FA Apartments- Paid v.ith Trust Check# 1024
NV Energy for FA Apartments Final Power BIii- 3000215633613624010 Paid v.ith Trust Check #1023
Cox Communlcallons, Inc, FA Apartments BIii-Acct. 0018610046251218 Paid with Trust Check #1022
Centuryllnk Bill- FA Apartments Account 309620459 Paid wilh Trust Check #1021
Trust Check #1029 to Hutchinson & Steffen, LLC Subcontracted Legal Services
Trust- Subcontracted Legal Services Retainer to Reade & Associates- Trust Check #1033
Trust Check #1038 to Mortensen & Rane tor Subcontracted Legal Services

Paid Amount

Balance

28,000.00
-1.500.00
-4,800.37
-550.00
-245.63
·2,000.00
-5,000.00
-355.19
-650,00
-521.62
-806.13
-460.41
·131.76
-102.34
-197.27
-150.12
-1,500,00
-1,807.75

28,000.00
26,500.00
21 ,699.63
21,149.63
20,904.00
18,904.00
13,804.00
13,548.81
12,998.81
12,477.19
11,671.06
11,210.65
11,Q78.89
10,976.65
10,779.28
10,629.16
9, 129.16
7,321.41

7,321.41

7,321.41

7,321.41

7,321.41

7,321.41

7,321.41

m

~

m
(j)
0

0
.....
0
.....
~
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